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ABSTRACT

THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS AQUINAS’ CONCEPT OF CREATEDNESS
ON JOSEF PIEPER’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

By
Sarah Slater
August 2020

Thesis supervised by Professor Daniel P. Scheid, Ph.D.
Josef Pieper’s practical moral philosophy can be best understood by reference to the
theology of Thomas Aquinas, and specifically Aquinas’ concept of the created human person.
Pieper uses Aquinas’ theological anthropology to argue for three actions which respond to the
reality of being created: giving assent to having been brought into existence by God, perceiving
God and created reality, and pursuing of the end of human life through the practice of the virtues
in order to receive beatitude.
Pieper’s well-known works on the seven virtues, on leisure, and on festivity rely on the
same concepts from Aquinas which Pieper examines in depth in his works of speculative
philosophy. By providing context for each of the selected works, this thesis demonstrates the
unity of Pieper’s speculative and practical moral philosophy as well as his conception of the ideal
human life in a society which allows both contemplation and divine worship.
iv
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CHAPTER 1:
JOSEF PIEPER’S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY
Josef Pieper was a moral philosopher whose life and work spanned the twentieth
century. Born in Germany, Pieper studied philosophy and law during the massive
upheavals that accompanied the aftermath of World War I and the interwar period and
began his professional life in the lead up to the second World War. In this context of rapid
change in his society, Pieper wrote essays which opposed his culture’s prevailing views
of work, virtue, and leisure. Pieper’s primary project was an effort to consider anew the
Western philosophical tradition and challenge his social context to grapple with the truths
contained within it. During his life, Pieper both opposed false conceptions of human
nature and proposed ways for each person to become more humane by living in
accordance with what human nature truly is.
To understand the work of Josef Pieper, it is crucial to understand the concepts
that underlie his work. Pieper adopted Saint Thomas Aquinas' position that humans were
created with the capacity to attend to the created world; consequently, a person who
rejects this createdness is unable to fully perceive reality, and ultimately unable to act in
accordance with the virtues. Thus, Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation provides necessary
context for Pieper’s practical works of moral philosophy. Several of Pieper's best-known
works, those on the seven virtues as well as In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity
and Leisure, the Basis of Culture, do not detail Pieper's views on human createdness, so it
is possible to misunderstand his arguments by reading those works in isolation from his
speculative moral philosophy and work on Aquinas. This thesis proposes a framework
based on Aquinas’ doctrine of creation through which to read the work of Josef Pieper
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about moral action in the world.
BIOGRAPHY
Josef Pieper’s boyhood, and much of the rest of his life, was spent living in and
around the city of Munster, Germany. He was raised Catholic and remained a practicing
Catholic through the end of his life. Through a former Dominican who taught at his
secondary school, Pieper first encountered the writing of Thomas Aquinas.1 Pieper was
involved with the German youth movement immediately after the end of the first World
War. In 1924, at an event sponsored by the youth movement, he heard a lecture by
Romano Guardini which spurred him to study Aquinas seriously as a philosopher.2 Pieper
matriculated at the University of Munich in the faculty of theology but switched to
philosophy in order to answer questions about the place of the person within creation, to
“[fix] his mind’s eye on the totality of being, the world.”3
During graduate school, Pieper studied seriously under Erich Przywara at a series
of summer seminars; these will be addressed in more detail below. In this period, Pieper
also encountered people who would later be recognized as significant figures in twentieth
century Catholicism, including Hans Urs von Balthasar, Edith Stein, and Marc Sangnier.
He notes in his autobiography that during his secular education in philosophy in preWWII Germany, there was very little interest in studying anything written before the
modern era, and much of his familiarity with the theologians and philosophers he
frequently cites (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Augustine, and so on) was acquired either in

Josef Pieper, No One Could Have Known, An Autobiography: The Early Years 1904-1945 (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1987). 46.
2
Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 62.
3
Josef Pieper, "The Philosophical Act," in Leisure the Basis of Culture (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
2009). 106.
1
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secondary school or at his own initiative.4 After graduating with his doctorate in
philosophy, Pieper was employed for a period by a sociological institute; he resigned
from that position coinciding nearly with, though not because of, the rise of the National
Socialist party to power in Germany.5 After his resignation in 1933 and until the end of
World War II, he worked as a freelance writer because he was unable to be employed at a
university under the Nazi regime. During the war, he had a position in the Luftwaffe as an
examining psychologist, to which he was appointed because of his training in sociology.
In general, Pieper was regarded by the Nazi regime as potentially disloyal, both because
of the ideas he espoused, and because his wife's brother had married a Jewish woman.6
Immediately after the war, and for many years afterwards, he supported himself
by lecturing at the University of Munster and at a teacher training college in Essen,
Germany.7 Although offered professorships at multiple institutions including at Munster,
Gottingen, Cologne, and Munich,8 Pieper refused these offers for more than a decade,
preferring to continue teaching and lecturing to non-specialists rather than those in
training for degrees in philosophy.9 He also lectured and traveled widely in Europe. In
1950, he began to take semester-long teaching positions at various American institutions
such as the University of Notre Dame and Stanford University.10 Pieper also travelled and
lectured in a number of Asian countries; one specific trip will be discussed later. Pieper
did eventually accept a full professorship at the University of Munster. Pieper had several

Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 65.
Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 87.
6
Pieper, No One Could Have Known. 127, 157, 161.
7
Josef Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964 (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press,
2015). 11; 14.
8
Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 28, 175, 182.
9
Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 30-1.
10
Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 75, 154.
4
5
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reasons for remaining a lecturer and writer to general audiences well into his forties. He
desired to provide “an academic education for the people… converting the multilingual
existence of the Western intellectual tradition into the living form of the German
language.”11 He was also interested in the attempt to “make [himself] comprehensible, in
[his] philosophizing, to the ordinary listener” and to always keep in mind the question
“What does it mean?” rather than resorting to “technical language” when possible.12
PIEPER’S PHILOSOPHY
Pieper resisted attempts to class him as a theologian for considering “prephilosophical data”13 within his work. It is notable that later in his career, Pieper
references Aristotle and Plato, especially Plato, at least as much as Christian
theologians.14 He also typically cites the Christian Bible to illustrate various cultures
rather than as an authority to justify his position. Pieper intentionally does not base his
arguments upon divine revelation, which is also Aquinas’ distinction between philosophy
and theology.15 On the other hand, Pieper’s moral philosophy does engage deeply with
Christian revelation and should be identified with the Christian philosophical tradition
because one of Pieper’s first principles is that the human person has been created by the
Christian God. Many of his works conclude that the end of human existence is to know

Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 176.
Pieper, Not Yet the Twilight. 177.
13
Bernard N. Schumacher, "The Twofold Discipleship of the Philosopher: Faith and Reason in the
Thought of Josef Pieper," in A Cosmpolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef
Pieper, ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2009). 199.
14
Juan F. Franck, "The Platonic Inspiration of Pieper's Philosophy," in A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity
and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper., ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, DC.: CUA
Press, 2009). 251.
15
Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologiae," ed. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York:
Benzinger Bros., 1947). I, 3, resp.
11
12
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and contemplate God, following from the Catholic Christian foundation for Pieper's
moral philosophy. Rather than reading Pieper in the context of modern philosophy, which
even when practiced by Christians maintains a secular character, Pieper ought to be read
as a philosopher in the tradition of pre-modern philosophy. His moral philosophy
provides a model for engagement with both the historical Christian tradition as well as
with one’s contemporary context. More specifically, Pieper’s philosophical work provides
a foundation for identifying issues relevant to contemporary theology.
By tracing three themes related to human createdness—assent to being, perception
of reality, and pursuit of the end of human life—in Pieper’s speculative philosophy and
identifying their use in Aquinas’ thought, it is possible to better understand Pieper’s
works on the virtuous life. Despite discussion in the literature of the Pieper’s
understanding of these three ideas, there have been few attempts to systematically trace
any of these three themes through multiple of Pieper’s essays. In addition, Pieper's works
are typically read individually, rather than in context. Many essays primarily reference
Leisure, the Basis of Culture or his works on Aquinas, and connections between his
works have been less studied than his contemporaries.
Almost as soon as he began to write, Pieper was translated and read across the
world, particularly by those influenced by Thomas Aquinas. For example, his
autobiography reports that his works on the four cardinal virtues were in the library of
Pope John XXIII.16 A list of those who have often cited, written about, or introduced
Pieper’s works includes many of the luminaries of twentieth century theology,
philosophy, and ethics, although as Wald notes, Pieper has been often referenced but

16
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infrequently engaged at great depth.17 Ralph McInerny, a Thomist whose tenure at Notre
Dame spanned more than a half a century, was instrumental in seeing many of Pieper’s
works translated into English.
Gilbert Meilaender describes Pieper’s essays on the virtues as an early example of
the return to Aristotelian and Platonic moral philosophy which occurred in the twentieth
century. In the Anglophone world, this can be seen in the works of Iris Murdoch, G.E.M.
Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, and the virtue ethics tradition in general.18 However,
despite the similarity in themes between English-language virtue ethicists and Pieper, a
review of the literature shows almost no engagement in either direction. Pieper responds
directly to primarily German philosophers, although he did read English writers and was
deeply influenced by Saint John Henry Cardinal Newman. A review of the works of
major virtue ethicists show little to no awareness of Pieper. A fruitful direction for further
research would be to compare Pieper’s essays on specific virtues with major accounts of
the virtues put forth by Anglophone virtue ethicists. One of the few essays to situate
Pieper in the context of twentieth century philosophy was written by Berthold Wald for A
Cosmopolitan Hermit. In the essay, Wald compares Pieper’s work to major figures in the
virtue ethics tradition, including Alasdair MacIntyre, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Richard
Hare.19 He argues that where there are differences between Pieper and contemporary
virtue ethicists, that difference is often rooted in Pieper’s Catholic anthropology.20
Bernard Schumacher’s introductory essay to A Cosmopolitan Hermit, the only
Berthold Wald, "Josef Pieper in the Context of Modern Philosophy," in A Cosmopolitan Hermit:
Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper., ed. Bernard N. Schumacher (Washington, DC.:
CUA Press, 2009). 24.
18
Gilbert Meilaender, "Josef Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue," Journal of
Religious Ethics 11, no. 1 (1983).
19
Wald, "Josef Pieper in the Context of Modern Philosophy."
20
Wald, "Josef Pieper in the Context of Modern Philosophy." 60-61.
17
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comprehensive academic treatment of Josef Pieper’s thought, provides an overview of
major themes in Pieper’s work. Schumacher refers to the metaphysics of creation as the
“secret key” to Pieper’s philosophy,21 and points out essential elements of his reliance on
the concept. At the beginning of his career, Pieper was influenced by Plato, Aquinas, and
Romano Guardini, writing his thesis and habilitation on “the basis for moral human
action and the truth of things”22 which is the existence of reality outside the human self.
Pieper’s argument is that “every good moral human action has its first origin in the silent
contemplation of the truth of things.”23 While studying under Erich Przywara, Pieper
began to argue that “the real cannot be enclosed within any system of thought,” which
influenced his resistance to regarding scholasticism as a closed system. Pieper’s works on
the virtues are based on an anthropology of man “on the way.”24 After being hired as a
lecturer in 1946, Pieper began to reflect on topics including education, culture, the rising
totalitarian culture of work, and “the philosophical act” which is not useful, although not
lacking in purpose or meaning.25
Throughout his work, Pieper addresses two related but separate relationships
between the virtues. The first relationship is between the natural virtues as they are
practiced by any individual Christian person; does a Christian necessarily experience
conflict between the natural form of fortitude and the grace-infused form of fortitude?
More generally, do the natural virtues necessarily conflict with the theological virtues?
The second relationship is between the virtues in general: are all the virtues related in
Bernard N. Schumacher, "A Cosmopolitan Hermit: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Josef Pieper,"
in A cosmpolitan hermit: Modernity and tradition in the philosophy of Josef Pieper, ed. Bernard N.
Schumacher (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2009). 14.
22
Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 4.
23
Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 6.
24
Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 11.
25
Schumacher, "Cosmopolitan Hermit." 17.
21
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some fundamental which gives them some sort of unified quality?26 The ethicist Gilbert
Meilaender addressed the first question at some length in his work The Theory and
Practice of Virtue. While the second question will be addressed throughout this work,
Meilaender’s Theory and Practice is most useful for addressing the first question.
Meilaender argues that Pieper only sometimes makes clear whether he believes that the
theological virtues are in some way opposed to the natural virtues.27 He notes that Pieper
most clearly discusses this relationship in his essays on prudence and charity. Both
prudence and charity are continuous in the sense that they operate in the same manner in
their natural and grace-infused forms, yet they can conflict because their objects are often
opposed and usually different.28 Meilaender’s fundamental criticism of Pieper is that
Pieper pays insufficient attention to the reality of sin in the world and the problem of
competing goods in the moral life.29 However, Meilaender also notes that Pieper’s goal
was not to theorize but “to transmit and revitalize a Thomist vision of the virtuous

life.”30
As noted above, existing scholarship on Pieper sometimes focuses narrowly on
individual essays. For example, Aquinas Guilbeau, O.P. published an enlightening essay
on the relationship between fortitude and leisure: leisure can only be attained through the
practice of the virtue of fortitude.31 Guilbeau argues that in Pieper’s work on leisure, the
focus on the will and intellect minimizes the need for formation in the virtues,

The second question will be addressed throughout the rest of the work, but it is important to raise since
the relationship between all the virtues and the relationship between the natural and theological virtues are
27
Gilbert Meilaender, The Theory and Practice of Virtue (South Bend, IN.: Notre Dame Press, 1984). 28.
28
Meilaender, Theory and Practice. 35-40.
29
Meilaender, Theory and Practice. 35.
30
Meilaender, "Josef Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue."
31
O.P. Guilbeau, Aquinas, "The Courage to Rest: Thomas Aquinas on the Soul of Leisure," Article, 16, no.
1 (2018).
26
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particularly magnanimity and humility, which allow for the pursuit of leisure by ordering
the passions.32 By primarily reading Leisure, the Basis of Culture, Guilbeau neglects
other works by Pieper which address the issue he raises more directly. It is true Pieper
does not discuss the virtues that allow for the achievement of leisure to the degree
Guilbeau would like to see in Leisure. However, Pieper’s essays On Fortitude and On
Hope both contain extended discussions of the virtues of humility and magnanimity and
their relationship to leisure, with reference to the specific questions Guilbeau faults
Pieper for not referencing.
Though the scholarly literature on Pieper is thin compared to the literature
discussing many of his contemporaries, Pieper has attracted more attention in recent
years, particularly from younger scholars. The essay collection referenced above, A
Cosmpolitan Hermit, contains a number of technical articles about Pieper’s philosophy.
Other essays and reviews of Pieper’s work often note his insistence that leisure and
contemplation are necessary (and, in the modern world, absent) for a humane life. For
example, Nathaniel Warne has considered how prudence and Pieper's idea of negative
philosophy can improve the study and practice of science.33 Vincent Wargo has also
addressed Pieper’s works on the virtues and his theory of history.34 Yet as a whole, the
secondary literature on Josef Pieper is narrow in scope or concerned with other themes
than the topic of this work. Excepting a number of other essays by the authors listed
above and two doctoral theses which are unavailable except by application to the authors,
Guilbeau, "The Courage to Rest: Thomas Aquinas on the Soul of Leisure." 40, 43.
Nathaniel A. Warne, "Learning to See the World Again: Josef Pieper on Philosophy, Prudence, and the
University.," Moral Education 47, no. 3 (2018). "Of All Things, Seen and Unseen: Josef Pieper's
Negative Philosophy, Science, and Hope.," Theological Studies 79, no. 2 (2018).
34
“Vincent Wargo, "Festivity, tradition, and hope: Josef Pieper and the historical meaning of human
praxis," Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought & Culture 21, no. 4 (2018). "Josef Pieper on the nature of
philosophy and the philosophical act," The Modern Schoolman 80, no. 2 (2003).
32
33

9

Pieper's corpus has not been addressed as a unified body of work. Much remains to be
said about his conception of the world.
Pieper deeply engaged with the “Western tradition” particularly as found in
Aquinas’ writings, frequently returning to Aquinas because of his charity to his
interlocutors and openness to seeking the truth wherever it could be found.35 Pieper
regarded himself as a true philosopher rather than a historian of philosophy, who aimed to
discover the “truth of things”; he was thus open to engagement with existential and
nihilist philosophers, as well as with Christian contemporaries and predecessors. This
openness can serve as a model for the theologian or philosopher willing to engaging with
the problems identified by the modern and post-modern worlds, while remaining rooted
in a specific tradition. Both Pieper and Aquinas shared this orientation toward truth which
allowed for philosophers who might not have otherwise been considered acceptable to the
Catholic “Western tradition” to be appropriated for discussion. This makes Pieper an
important resource for encountering our pluralistic world.
Assent to reality, perception of reality, and the pursuit of the end are the three
structuring ideas from Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation which I have identified as crucial
to Pieper’s thought. The second chapter will discuss the meaning of these three key
concepts as understood by Pieper, to orient the reader to his use of the concepts. This will
be followed by an analysis of the relationship between leisure and festivity, because of
the importance of those elements in Pieper’s idea of the end of human life as it can be
experienced on earth. The third chapter will look more closely at how Aquinas discusses

Josef Pieper, "On Thomas Aquinas," in The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays (South Bend: St.
Augustine Press, 1999). 20, 32. "Preface," in The Four Cardinal Virtues
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965). xii.
35

10

the concepts of being, perception, and end. This chapter will draw out texts which give
context for Aquinas’ idea of creation. The final chapter will address three areas of
Pieper’s work on the moral life, examining them in the context of the proposed
framework. After sections introducing Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the
Basis of Culture, a polemic against the modern tendency to order life to work rather than
rest, will be examined for insight on the way that assent to human createdness creates the
space to pursue leisure. Then, Pieper’s idea of the possibility of experiencing the end of
human life during life on earth will be examined through a reading of A Theory of
Festivity, which is a positive vision for the recovery of the divine festival in public life.
These discussions will be followed by a conclusion which discusses the radical nature of
Pieper’s assessment of modern life, and what the reader of Pieper ought to take away
from the encounter with his work on the virtues, festivity, and leisure as a created person.

11

CHAPTER 2:
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING PIEPER
Before discussing Thomas Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation and the end of human
existence, it is important to understand how Pieper understands these concepts. Pieper’s
use of Aquinas’ thought enables Pieper to link his proposals for how to live a virtuous life
to the objective, real world which exists independent of the perceiving person. This
chapter will provide a framework for understanding Pieper's practical moral philosophy
based on Aquinas' metaphysics of creation, by discussing how human perception of
reality, and the ultimate purpose and destination of all creation, relates to moral action.
For Pieper, these two elements—perception and end—are deeply interrelated aspects of
existence. Because these concepts are discussed more in Pieper’s speculative philosophy
and commentary on Aquinas than in his practical moral philosophy, Pieper’s works
Happiness and Contemplation and The Silence of St. Thomas, will be referenced. After
discussing Pieper’s understanding of Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation, the next chapter
will explore these concepts in context. Then, this framework will be applied to Pieper’s
practical moral philosophy.
Pieper’s works on the virtuous life consistently propose the same actions in
response to the order of the created universe.1 The proper response to being is to assent to
being. The response to truth is to perceive the truth of reality. The response to the desire

For the purposes of this paper, this includes Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the Basis of
Culture, and In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity. Pieper did write other essays in addition to these
which could be said also address the virtuous life, including additional essays on some of the virtues, such
as Hope and History.
1
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for goodness is to pursue goodness by seeking the end toward which human nature is
aimed. Pieper thus argues that the virtuous life is lived by acting in accordance with the
realities of being, truth, and goodness as are understood according to the western
Christian tradition, and principally Aquinas. These responses are not a linear progression
but build upon and reinforce each other. For example, by pursuing goodness through the
practice of the virtue of love in particular ways, over time a person is able to affirm the
goodness of a particular person more fully and concretely. Because Pieper holds to the
ultimate unity of the seven classical virtues of Western philosophy, each virtue must share
some characteristics of all the other virtues.2 The practice of the virtues over time enables
a person to act more fully in accord with human nature.
ASSENTING TO CREATEDNESS
Pieper’s understanding of Aquinas was not initially well received in Germany, but
it has lasting relevance for the interpretation of Pieper’s own work. In his essay on

2

The theory that the virtues have an underlying unity has not been accepted without controversy in the
twentieth century. Two important accounts are given by Vlastos and Langan. Vlastos proposes that
Socrates’ Protogoras is a coherent articulation of the unity of the virtues, arguing a single thesis in three
stages. That thesis is that “having any virtue entails having every virtue … by saying that what names each
names all, and that they are all cogeners, all alike.” Vlastos reads Socrates as arguing that to have a virtue a
person must necessarily possess wisdom (Gregory Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the "Protogoras","
The Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 3 (1972). 425.) Virtues are to be interpreted as unified not as universals
but as “coextensive classes”, and individual virtuous acts necessarily possess the qualities of the other
virtues (Vlastos, "Protogoras." 436, 439.) Langan, following Penner, finds that the underlying “unity” of
the virtues is best understood as a “motive force” or “principle of action” which underlies all virtuous acts
(John P. Langan, "Augustine on the Unity and the Interconnection of the Virtues," The Harvard Theological
Review 72, no. 1/2. 83.) The virtue Augustine identifies as “the explanatory entity that accounts for, and so
is effectively present in, the cardinal virtues” is charity (Langan, "Augustine." 91.) Augustine, however, in
identifying the source of the unity of the virtues as charity makes it difficult or impossible to ascribe virtue
to non-Christians (Langan, "Augustine." 93.) Langan’s understanding of a virtue as a “motive force”
accords with Aquinas’ understanding of a virtue as a habit, an understanding to which Pieper subscribes.
Vlastos’ reading of Socrates similarly accords with Aquinas, for whom virtues are connected because any
virtue must be accompanied by prudence (Aquinas, "ST." I-II, 65, 1). Overall, Pieper’s conception of the
unity of the virtue is more closely aligned with Socrates,’ since in Pieper’s moral philosophy, prudence
serves the function Socrates ascribes to wisdom.
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Aquinas’ negative philosophy—that is, philosophy which works by elimination of what is
unknown, rather than by assertion of what is known—Pieper argues that Aquinas
conceives of creation not in the abstract, but very concretely in the sense of “created
things.” Pieper also adopts Aquinas’ division of everything that can be known into
“creatura or Creator.”3 Pieper says that Aquinas' idea that all things which have existence
exist as created underlies “nearly all the basic concepts in St. Thomas's philosophy of
being.” This means that all that exists or has reality has been created by the Creator, God.
Furthermore, everything that exists as created has an internal structure or nature
which has been deliberately designed to conform to a certain plan.4 Creaturae “have been
fashioned by thought”—God’s thought—and designed to exist according to this nature.
They can be described as true insofar as they conform to that design.5 (In fact, whether an
object has been made by man, an artifact, or created by God: every object, animal, spirit,
and person has a given nature.)6 That things exist because they are created by God is not
only a statement about the Creator but also about creation: “things exist because God sees
them”; all things “are formed after an archetypal pattern which dwells in the mind of
God.”7 It is also a statement about the human ability to have contact with any other
creatura, “something that has ‘flamed up’ directly from God.”8 In his acceptance of
created human nature, Pieper explicitly rejects philosophers who deny there is such a
Pieper, "The Negative Element in the Philosophy of St. Thomas." 49.
Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 51.
5
Pieper, "Negative Philosophy." 53.
6
Christian theology typically affirms that this is in an analogous way true of God. God is His will and His
intellect; God is identical with his being. Although God has not been created or fashioned by anything else,
God does have a nature which is stable.
7
Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation, trans. Clara and Richard Winston (South Bend: St.
Augustine's Press, 1998). 61.
8
Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, trans. Clara and Richard Winston (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
1991).
3
4
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thing.9 Pieper specifically positions himself in direct opposition to Sartre’s atheistic
existentialism by affirming the doctrine of creation, but views his project as a consistent
interpretation of the world, insofar as Sartre argues from the position that there is no
God.10
For Pieper, human desire is only satisfied by things that really exist outside the
person. The human desire for happiness is oriented entirely toward the “real universe”;
“man desires satiation by reality.”11 But before individual created things can be affirmed
as good, assent to the goodness of creation in general must be given.12 Pieper notes that
our response to any good created thing tends to universalize; we affirm more than the
specific good alone. Characteristically interested in alternate witnesses to the human
search for the truth, Pieper references love poetry as pointing to the universal human
desire for what is good.13 Although God is not a part of the world but within and outside
it, Pieper asserts that we can also reach God because we have been created to be able to
communicate with him.14
Pieper identifies Aquinas’ interest in Aristotle as deriving from Aristotle’s
“affirmation of the concrete and sensuous reality of the world” which allowed him to
develop a more robust “Christian affirmation of Creation.”15 This orientation toward
external, created reality can be identified as “worldliness” but that was not Aquinas’
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intent. The goal of Aquinas’ inclusion of philosophical approaches to “natural reality as a
whole… visible, sense-perceived… material things [as well as] the natural cognitive
power of reason”16 in his theology rather than simply appealing to Christian revelation
was his conviction that secular truth, insofar as it reflects reality, also has bearing on the
experience of the Christian person in the world. To attend only to revelation risks a
heretical devaluation of the created world and the embodied human person as well.
Instead, Aquinas refers to the exterior created world as “the standard” or measure with
which the person must reckon in order to ensure that her idea of reality is in accordance
with reality as it exists.17 This idea will be returned to in the next section. It was Aquinas’
“all-inclusive, fearless strength of his affirmation, his generous acceptance of the whole
of reality” which enabled Aquinas to affirm truth wherever it could be found in the world,
including in the works of those with whom he disagreed. Pieper proposes that this
affirming and welcoming attitude must be adopted in order to fully behold the truth of the
world.18
PERCEIVING REALITY
What is reality? As discussed above, Pieper follows Aquinas in arguing reality is
anything that has been is “creatively thought by God.”19 The perception of reality is, for
Pieper, really possible by virtue of our created nature and the nature of the created world.
Not only can we perceive reality, we can also to some extent perceive God. But the
perception of both of these is limited; the same nature which allows us to perceive reality
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also limits our perception of creatura and the Creator. Does this inability to see in whole
mean that we therefore give up the search to know at all? No—because although we
cannot see fully, we can still see in part; it is only because we see in part that we can
discover that we cannot see in full.20
Perception, an interior act of the intellect, is primarily directed to the real, exterior
world. Furthermore, certain created things, including human beings, have the capability
to perceive the material world because they have been created with that ability by God.
Pieper argues that we can be confident that the world is real and able to be perceived if
we assent to the proposition that we are created with that ability. While this perception is
limited by our finitude it is real, despite reality surpassing our ability to understand it
totally. The human mind is only able to know things because of the existence of God,
who created human nature with this capacity for perception.21

Human mind

↔

things

Human mind

←

↔

God

God

Similarly, humanity is able to know other creaturae because the creatively
knowing mind of God has created things such that they are knowable.22 To the extent that
a thing has been designed by a human person, it can be fully known by others in its ideal
form; but to the extent that it exists as creatura, human knowledge is unable to completely
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uncover the mystery of the thing, insofar as every creatura is rooted in the infinite depths
of the mind of God.23 The conception of reality as the ‘measure’ or the shaping standard
of the human mind is, for Pieper, a very important aspect of the relationship between
created reality and the human mind.24 Aquinas notes that while human minds can
‘measure’ things we make, our minds can neither measure other created things, nor fully
perceive God. Furthermore, we can only know God through the mediation of things. God,
however, both knows created things and knows individual people directly.25 Pieper
describes this relation:
“we know the copy, but not the relation of the copy to the archetype, the
correspondence between what has been designed and its first design. To
repeat, we have no power of perceiving this correspondence by which the
formal truth of things is constituted.”26
It is not possible for us to fully understand the relationship between a thing and God.
For Aquinas, the unknowability of creatura exists because of the weakness of our
ability to know, not because the thing itself is unknowable. Pieper examines this idea at
length in his brief essay on the Negative Element in Philosophy of St. Thomas. “Because
Being is created, that is to say creatively thought by God, it is therefore 'in itself' light,
radiant, and revealing” Pieper argues, because it partakes of the infinitely ordered and
self-revealing nature of God. Any created object can never be fully known since as an
element of its createdness, Pieper says, it is
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“something that has so much light that a particular finite faculty of
knowledge cannot absorb it all… it is part of the very nature of things that
their knowability can never be wholly exhausted by any finite intellect
because these things are creatures, which means that the very element
which makes them known must necessarily be at the same time the reason
things are unfathomable.”27
Because the essence of any creatura emerges from God, we cannot see the full depths of
its being. A given kind of thing, or form, is knowable through the copies that exist; the
originating idea contained within the mind of God is not knowable in full.28 “We have no
proper means of knowing the distinctive element in things... [or] the essence of things.”29
We can know the exemplar (an actualized thing) but not the type (the form or idea of a
thing).
To return to what was noted above: because we cannot know things wholly, we
also cannot know God fully through things—because any finite created thing cannot
perfectly represent the infinite God; and also because the human mind as creatura is “too
crude and obtuse (imbicilitas intellectus nostri) to read in things even that information
concerning God which they really contain.”30 Further, for Aquinas, “the special manner in
which the Divine Perfection is imitated is what constitutes the special essence of a thing.”
Thus, it is not possible for humans to fully grasp an essence, insofar as it is impossible for
us to grasp the Divine.31 For Pieper, this double affirmation—that creaturae exist as
‘seeable,’ and that humans as creaturae are unable to see other creaturae or the Creator in
full—is necessary in order to understand how Aquinas is not an agnostic or a pure
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rationalist.32 The human quest for knowledge cannot be complete but it is also not futile;
it is, like human life, in status viator and characterized by “hope” in the context of “an
embracing affirmation” which continually seeks to know more fully.33
The perception of reality through cognition is the only way in which the exterior
world is totally taken into the person.34 In fact, we have no way to have contact with the
real world which is outside ourselves except through cognition. This is not to say that all
forms of cognition are this perfect taking-in of reality. But the perfect form of taking-inreality, which Pieper describes using the terms “seeing, intuition, contemplation,” is a
mode of cognition.35 Perception of reality is in itself a good we desire; “we want to know
the truth at any cost, even if the truth should be frightful.”36 Once again—although we
cannot see in full, we have been created to see, and we require the ability to know in
order to be happy.
PERCEIVING THE GOOD
Having argued that created persons can perceive created reality, Pieper argues that
it is also possible to perceive what is good. Virtuous actions are those actions which,
having perceived the good, make it possible to attain the good which is the goal of human
life. Before touching on virtuous action more specifically, it is important to understand
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what goodness is. Pieper most explicitly addresses his idea of goodness and the end in his
work Happiness and Contemplation, so that text will be examined in detail in this
section. As in most of his works, Pieper begins by examining the language he will use.
Pieper considers and rejects the use of eudaimonia to describe the kind of happiness he
describes. Seen the context of twentieth century virtue ethics, where the virtues are
practiced to achieve eudaimonia, that is, “to flourish or live well,”37 Pieper’s rejection of
eudaimonia is interesting.38 He instead adopts makarios, or its Latin equivalent beatus, in
order to echo Aquinas’ use of “beatitude” and the use of makarios in the original Greek of
the New Testament. Pieper selects these words for their suggestion of “men’s share in the
untrammeled happiness of the gods.”39 Translations of Pieper’s work follow this
preference and often use beatitude or blessedness where other philosophers might talk of
human flourishing. The following review of his idea of happiness should be read in this
light, that is, that Pieper defines human happiness as participation in divine happiness.
Pieper, following Aquinas, argues from the position that that human nature desires
happiness, and has no ability to not desire happiness.40 In contrast to his contemporaries,
Pieper explicitly opposes this acknowledgment of the unchosen human longing for
happiness to Kant’s idea of the supremacy of the will, referencing his Critique of
Practical Reason and Foundations of the Metaphysic of Ethics.41 “Only if we understand
man as a created being to the very depths of his spiritual existence can we meaningfully
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conceive that the will has not the power to not want happiness.”42 As has been discussed,
the denial of createdness is also the denial of human nature.
Happiness, in order to be ultimate happiness, must be attainable and must not
exclude the dimensions of human happiness which make happiness identifiable as
happiness—that is, it is not legitimate to re-define happiness to the extent that it is
unrecognizable.43 Yet the emotions of joy and pleasure themselves are not happiness; they
are signs that an exterior good exists and has been possessed in some way. 44 “Joy is the
response of a lover receiving what he loves.”45 What can produce this kind of ultimate
happiness? The will’s infinite desire has been noted above: it is not love of any created
good that can satisfy the will’s desire. Ultimately, the whole created world is insufficient
to satisfy human desire:
“Man as he is constituted, endowed as he is with a thirst for happiness,
cannot have his thirst quenched in the finite realm; and if he thinks or
behaves as if that were possible, he is misunderstanding himself, he is
acting contrary to his own nature.”46
It is impossible for creation to satisfy the desire within man, because as a spirit, the soul
must be able to encounter and take into itself everything in the universe; and yet that
“means that the finite spirit by virtue of its essence is unquenchable and insatiable—
unless it partakes of God.”47
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For his definition of happiness Pieper takes as his starting point Thomas Aquinas'
dictum in the Summa Contra Gentiles that “man's ultimate happiness consists in
contemplation.”48 It is not intuitive that the intellectual act of contemplation provides
happiness; yet the normal sources of pleasure people seek are not capable of providing
final and complete satisfaction.49 Human nature has the ability, capacitas, to aim at an
external reality as an object, even if that object is beyond our ability to take in in its
entirety.50 It is assent to reality and the perception of reality which allow us to grasp
goodness, the goal of human life. The ultimate end of human life is the attainment of
perfect happiness, which is perfect union with God through contemplation. This
partaking of God, “the utmost perfection to which man may attain, the fulfillment of his
being, is visio beatificia.”51 This end can be variously thought of as a terminus (the end
of the earthly journey), a goal, or as the ultimate satisfaction of human desires. Pieper
argues that every person, not only philosophers, has the potential to achieve this “eternal
contemplative happiness with God.”52
Why is happiness contemplation of God specifically, and not another kind of
earthly pleasure or joy? Only an infinite God can satisfy the will’s desire for endless
goodness. And only through cognition can something exterior to the person be brought
into the person.53 Through perception of reality, which requires assent to human
createdness and assent to the existence of the Creator, humanity is able to contemplate
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God, the source of goodness.54 Only if God has created humanity with the ability to reach
out to God can there be a possibility for communication with God. Without accepting
createdness, Pieper sees no possibility of ultimate happiness in the sense of beatitude,
being filled with all possible goodness.
Pieper suggests that perception is most perfect when what is beheld is loved by
the person who sees. “There are things which the lover alone observes... the lover
partakes of goods which are withheld from all others.”55 There is a kind of awareness
which can only be attained by a person who loves. That loving is contemplation,
“intuition of the beloved object.”56 Pieper identifies three elements to contemplation.
First, it is “silent perception of reality”, intuiting what is present.57 Second, it is not
arrived at by a process of reasoning but through reception or intuition alone; here Pieper
borrows the distinction used by Aquinas between ratio or discursive reasoning and
intellectus or simple intuition.58 Pieper almost exclusively uses ‘seeing’ to denote that
immediate perception which is intuition. Third, Pieper notes that the traditional definition
of contemplation has included amazement, which is specifically the reaction of a created,
finite soul to something that has been revealed.59 Contemplation can take different forms.
While all are characterized by “the loving, yearning, affirming bent toward that happiness
which is the same as God Himself,”60 contemplation is often a loving affirmation of
earthly things. Contemplation looks to the heart of created realities and sees the reflected
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glory of God there.61
Since, Pieper argues, the highest form of happiness is contemplation of God, is
happiness possible on earth? It is absolutely true that the most perfect satisfaction of this
desire takes place in heaven, but Western Christianity has consistently affirmed that
within “historical existence” it is possible to experience this “focusing of an inner gaze”
on something which can be imperfectly seen, but seen in some capacity, nonetheless.62
What is seen through earthly contemplation is, in part, the revelation that there is a deeper
kind of perception than earthly contemplation. Yet though earthly contemplation leaves a
person longing, it “is able to quench man's thirst more than anything else because it
affords a direct perception of the presence of God.”63 As it has been established above,
contemplation is direct perception or intuition, not discursive reasoning or 'thinking'
proper. Objection to contemplation as the highest happiness is rooted in a rejection of the
world as either fundamentally good or as a creation. “Neither happiness nor
contemplation is possible without consent to the world as a whole... [even when] granted
amid tears and the extremes of horror.”64 Pieper affirms that despite the circumstances of
the world, not only the act of happiness (contemplation) but also “the object of that act,
that drink called happiness” is available on earth.
It is worth emphasizing that while happiness must be achieved through the act of
contemplation, it is not earned but only ever granted as a gift.65 Pieper makes the
distinction that human striving can attain eudaimonia, that is, the possession of goods and
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wealth, but makarios, man's participation in the blessedness of the gods, is beyond our
ability to acquire.66 “No one can obtain felicity by pursuit... we cannot make ourselves
happy.”67 Without divine assistance, the search for happiness is a “blind seeking” for
something which we cannot properly identify or understand how to obtain.68
Nevertheless, Pieper argues that earthly happiness is within the reach of each person. This
happiness is a gift, but there are actions that can be taken to prepare to receive the gift.
These actions are the virtues.
ACTING IN RESPONSE TO CREATEDNESS
Pieper’s essays on practical virtue are written from the perspective of being ‘onthe-way,’ status viatoris, seeking the beatific vision. There are three actions that dominate
Pieper’s work in relation to the end: pursuing the end through virtuous acts; resting in the
end or a foretaste of the end through leisure and contemplation; and celebrating the
attainment or partial attainment of the end through festivity. (Only the first of these
actions is typically addressed in works on the virtues, but for Pieper, leisure and festivity
are the marks of a virtuous society.) Each of these actions is made possible because of the
recognition that the world is good, springing from what Berthold Wald calls a
“theologically founded worldliness,” which is a term also used in certain of Pieper’s
essays to describe Aquinas’ project of accepting the good in Aristotelian philosophy.
Pieper’s essays offer suggestions for how to think about the meaning of the
Christian virtues. The seven virtues, leisure, and festivity are proposed as a corrective to
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modernity, which in rejecting the ideas of creation from nonexistence, the goodness of
created existence, and the existence of the Creator from whom the world emerges, also
rejects the Christian vision of the well-lived life.69 In brief, Pieper’s idea of virtue can be
summarized as follows. Because of the createdness of humanity, there are ways in which
it is proper to the nature of the person to act; this is virtue. As a philosopher who relies
heavily on Aristotle and Plato, Pieper acknowledges the ability of those outside the
church to practice the natural virtues. However, virtue can only be present to its highest
degree in the Christian who has access through baptism to grace unavailable to those
outside the church.
The goodness of creation pervades Pieper’s treatment of the virtues. Pieper
adopted Aquinas’ summary of a fundamental theme within revelation, “Everything
created by God is good.”70 Starting, then, from the goodness of creation, Pieper makes
human nature a central part of his arguments in each of the virtues. Pieper insists that the
practice of virtuous living is a human practice. The human person is not a good spirit
attached to an evil body which corrupts the soul, but human body-and-soul. Therefore,
virtue regulates both the body and the soul, and in fact an act is virtuous only when both
body and soul are rightly ordered. Furthermore, as Meilaender notes, for Pieper the
virtues require possession of the other virtues, since no action can be virtuous when
directed toward a bad end.71 Because the virtuous life is a unity, this entails the practice
of all the virtues. However, the virtue of prudence is especially important because it is by
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prudence that a person is able to perceive the createdness of the world.72 Thus, in the
treatment of the virtues below, while the separate essays are treated individually this is in
some ways an artificial division. Certain of Pieper’s works are written to illuminate how
a share in beatitude is possible in this life—this idea is addressed in Leisure, the Basis of
Culture and In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity.73 Leisure and Festivity address
the kinds of false rest and false worship the contemporary societies practice, as well as
defining what true worship and true rest are. To seek the wrong kind of happiness by
misidentifying the good will, over time, not only fail to satisfy but also will distort the
will and pull the seeker of happiness further from God.
Pieper devotes several works to these ideas because he contends that “it is
peculiar to our time that we may conceive of festivity itself as being expressly
repudiated.”74 Pieper notes that both happiness and contemplation “demand eternity;”
that is, they put us in contact with what eternity is like because we can 'stand' to be happy
for a long time. We are “capable of remaining longer without fatigue or distraction than in
any other activity.”75 In contrast, contemporary societies flatten reality to deny the
supernatural dimension which is necessary for happiness. In A Theory of Festivity, Pieper
acknowledges that other societies throughout history have also lacked the ability to
achieve festivity. In particular, he references the Baroque period in European history, and
acknowledges that some the ancient Greeks sometimes found their own festivals “empty
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and wearisome pomp.”76 The question of festival is an eternal problem intensified by the
radically anti-human world of modern work which confronted Pieper. Just as the Church
has historically defined dogma in response to the challenge of heresy, Pieper sets himself
the task of explicitly defining festivity and leisure in order to defend them. In the process,
he relates the two concepts to the virtues and outlines a theory of their practice in a
rightly ordered human society.
Most briefly stated, leisure is a rest in the contemplation of God, while festival is a
celebration of the good. Leisure often takes place in silence or alone, while a festival
necessarily takes place in a social context. (One can have a festive attitude when alone,
although perhaps it makes more sense to say that one may participate in the celebration of
a feast alone.) The primary aspect of leisure is contemplation and openness to created
reality. When leisure overflows into celebration, it is called festivity. Each includes the
other, yet it makes sense to talk about them as individual phenomena because while
festival is an aspect of leisure, leisure is not exclusively festive. And a festival contains
other elements than leisure alone—most importantly worship, but also acted expression
of celebration, which have a special significance of their own. An essential element of
festivity is an abundance of joy, although that joy may be expressed as sorrow over the
absence of a joy. On the other hand, leisure is frequently something other than pure
worship or the creation of art, though those two elements may also be found in leisure.
Festivity also has a necessarily communal aspect which is not necessary for leisure.
These two concepts will be addressed in much more depth in the final chapter. The most
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crucial distinction is that festivity in its most intense form is leisure. Two other concepts
which are important (and have already been discussed) are contemplation and ultimate
happiness. The chart below summarizes the relationships between these four primary
concepts in Pieper’s writing:

Figure 1: Relationships between core concepts in Pieper. Figure created by the author.

Leisure leads to contemplation and contemplation is an aspect of leisure. Festival is an
element of leisure. Leisure makes possible fullest happiness. A festival directly expresses
a community’s approach to fullest happiness. Contemplation is identical to ultimate
happiness. And finally, though not reflected on this diagram, both contemplation and
fullest happiness are acts in the sense that they are actions of the intellectus as the person
strives to take exterior reality into the interior of the person.
Only when a person acknowledges the exterior world as created can it be
conceived of as real, and only when the human person is created to be able to have a
30

reliable perception of the real world through the senses can there be a possibility for real
cognition of the world. Human desire seeks fulfillment in created reality but is ultimately
satisfied by union with God in contemplation. Contemplation of God is most perfectly
fulfilled in the life which comes to the person after death, but it is also possible on earth
through actions the human person takes. Without perception of the real world, there is no
possibility for human happiness on earth. Pieper relies on these concepts in order to
structure many of his works, but especially his works on the virtuous life, which will be
addressed at the end of this essay. In certain cases, Pieper does not go into detail about
the specifics of his proposals for the virtuous life, but that is not his intent: Pieper strives
to provide a philosophical grounding for certain intuitions about the disorder of modern
life. However, before addressing Pieper, it is useful to turn to Aquinas in order to
understand the context for Pieper’s essays. As will be discussed, Aquinas was a
particularly important influence on the shape of Pieper’s works, and Aquinas’ work on
the metaphysics of creation must be understood in order to fully grasp what Pieper
intends.
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CHAPTER 3:
AQUINAS ON ASSENT, PERCEPTION, AND END
In 1924, a lecture by Romano Guardini on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas
inspired an intuition which served as the thesis for Pieper's doctoral dissertation and
continued to influence Pieper's philosophy for the rest of his life. As he expresses it in his
autobiography, this intuition was that:
“Every ought is grounded in an is; the good is what corresponds to reality.
If anyone wants to know and do good, he must direct his gaze to the
objective world of being; not to his own mind, not to his own conscience,
not to values, nor to ideals or paradigms he has himself drawn up. He must
look away from his own act and toward reality.”1
This orientation toward “objective reality” as the precondition for knowledge of the good
was Pieper’s basis for reading Aquinas.2 Pieper’s reliance on Aquinas’ metaphysics of
creation has been recognized as crucial to understand Pieper’s work by Bernard
Schumacher. 3 This holds true where Pieper cites Aquinas extensively for support, such as
Happiness and Contemplation, as well as when Aquinas is cited only rarely, for example
in Pieper’s In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity or in his many works intended
for non-specialists. But before looking at the specific contexts where Pieper references
these ideas, it is first necessary to review Thomas Aquinas' metaphysics of creation,
theory of knowledge, and perception of reality.
Pieper cites Aquinas as an example of the wisdom of humanity as expressed in the
Catholic Church, but by no means the only source of wisdom: “[h]e is intended as the
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witness for that tradition.”4 Pieper came to this tradition by an unusual route. While
theologians in Pieper’s time would have been very familiar with Aquinas, Pieper was not
trained as a theologian. As an undergraduate, Pieper studied law and philosophy;
moreover, his philosophy advisor concentrated his own work in animal psychology.5 In
consequence, Pieper’s study of Aquinas, though influenced by teachers such as a former
Dominican at his secondary school, Erich Przywara, and Romano Guardini, was selfmotivated and largely took place outside his formal university education, until he decided
to write his doctoral thesis on Aquinas.6
Pieper received significant training in the works of Aquinas under Erich Przywara
during summer college courses over a period of three years.7 Przywara also taught
notable twentieth century theologians including Hans Urs Von Balthasar, Edith Stein, and
others.8 Przywara’s Thomism emphasized Aquinas’ work on the distinction between
essence and existence, his theologia negativa, and is characterized by a “method of
immanent historical understanding that aimed at an objective synthesis,” as he describes.
Przywara opposed this method to contemporary neo-scholastics and neo-Thomists,
particularly those heavily influenced by the tradition of manuals and commentaries.9
Przywara was interested in conversation with modern philosophies like idealism and
existentialism, but refused to distort Thomism to be palatable to those philosophies; nor,
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however, would he keep Aquinas from any contact with modern philosophy.10
Following Erich Przywara, who similarly “was never a pure neo-scholastic”11
Pieper engaged in dialogue with contemporary philosophers insofar as he thought they
provided insight into what is true. Pieper’s criticisms of Thomists seem directed
sometimes at neo-scholastics and rigid neo-Thomists, though he also cites commentaries
including Suarez and Cajetan. At other times his criticisms seem to be directed at the
Transcendental Thomists,12 who sought to answer questions posed by Kantian
metaphysics with reference to Aquinas. While O’Meara argues that the Transcendental
Thomists did not “mix or compromise Aquinas with Kant,”13 Pieper describes their
project in a decidedly negative tone as one which “refers back to him [Aquinas] and
claims to bring his doctrine up to date.”14 Pieper’s reading of Aquinas was much more
influenced by historical-theological readings of Aquinas, including Etienne Gilson,
Marie-Dominique Chenu, and Fernand van Steenberghen, all of whom he appreciates
because of their “determination… to go beyond mere scholarliness and to ask and answer
the question of the truth of things.”15 Pieper did however dialogue with Kantian
metaphysics, as an instance of his disagreement with modern philosophy.
Because Pieper’s corpus is so large and because he published extensively on
Thomas, this chapter concentrates on the concepts within Aquinas which Pieper refers to
the most frequently: the world’s createdness and its relationship to the Creator; and the
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fact that goodness is rooted in external, objective reality.16 Pieper explicitly identifies
these themes as important to understanding Aquinas’ philosophy, and frequently returns
to them. Although not explicitly stated by Pieper in reference to his own work, I argue
that they are also crucial for understanding Pieper. By entering more fully into the themes
discussed above in their original context, Aquinas’ thought will provide context for
Pieper’s application of them in his works of practical moral philosophy.
AQUINAS ON CREATION AND BEING
As discussed in the first chapter, Aquinas argues that God accounts for the
existence of reality.17 Not only does God have the power to create, “we must hold firmly
that God can and does make things from nothing” (emphasis added.)18 Finally, God has
created everything that exists.19 While other spirits, angels, and creatures with material
bodies have the power to re-arrange matter and generate new life through natural
processes, this is not true creation. For Pieper, this is key to understanding the work of
Aquinas. Not only is it true that “nothing exists which is not creatura, except the Creator
Himself,” it is also the case that “this createdness determines entirely and all-pervasively
the inner structure of the creature.”20 For example, Aquinas notes that it is not possible to
understand the “being which is in creatures… except as derived from the divine being.”21
The concept of “being” in Aquinas necessarily requires assent to several
For the fullest presentation of Pieper’s thoughts on these ideas, see his works Reality and the Good and
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interrelated propositions about the nature of creation, creatures, and God. For example,
Aquinas argues that since all things have an essence or nature, this necessarily implies
that they were created.22 Yet this assumes a number of points—the existence of God
being foremost among them, but also that things have a nature at all, something which is
not at all obvious to the contemporary world. So, in order to understand this very
different picture of the world which has relevance both to understanding Aquinas as well
as Pieper’s work, the relationship of creation to God in Aquinas’ Disputed Questions on
the Power of God will be examined. Createdness, the quality creaturae have of existing as
created, is addressed at length in On the Power of God because God’s relationship to the
universe He creates and sustains in being is of primary concern when considering God’s
power.
In “On the Preservation of Things by God” in On the Power of God Aquinas
affirms that God has power over everything but emphasizes that God also respects the
essential natures of created things. God creates and holds everything in existence, and if
that action of creating and holding ever ceased, everything would return to the state of
nothing from which it was created.23 Although God has the power to annihilate, Aquinas
argues that since God “fashioned each nature in such a way as not to deprive it of its
property” he will not cease to uphold any creatura whose nature is to endure—although
not everything is intended to last forever.24 In a beautiful passage, Aquinas suggests that
the purpose for which the stars move is the filling of the kingdom of God, and when they
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have reached that end, the heavens will come to rest. Yet it is simultaneously true that the
universe “exists for the sake of existing, wherein it is like God”—it has an inherent
dignity to itself. Its integrity as creatura is respected, even while it is subject to God’s
will.25 In a discussion about the final destination of the elements of the universe, Aquinas
argues that they will be transformed: “the elements will remain in their substance and
natural qualities.” Though their movement and “corruption” will cease, their essential
qualities will be preserved.26 In all of these parts of the created world, God preserves their
natures as he has created them. Each of the parts of creation considered fulfill their role in
the universe by “[existing] for the sake of existing,” and each individual creatura acts
according to its end.27
Aquinas draws these threads together in the final article of the question which
considers the fate of the human body. Unlike the other parts of the material world
Aquinas considers, human beings are composed of both material body and immaterial
rational soul. Aquinas argues against those who posit that the body will pass away and the
soul alone will be united to God.28 Aquinas states that since Christ “never did and never
will put aside the body which once for all he reassumed in his resurrection” neither will
the saints, after the resurrection of the body, put aside their corporeal bodies.29 Aquinas
presents two reasons to support this argument: first, because it is human nature to be both
spirit and body. If the body passed away, the person would no longer be in accordance
with God’s design for the perfected human. The human body is not “accidental” to the
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person, but an essential element of the person.30 The second reason follows from the
preceding articles of the question, which can be distilled to asking what in creation will
remain when the world is transformed. Everything will be radically changed, and some of
the parts of the universe will be ended. But everything in the universe, even including the
elements, will be preserved and raised up to fulfill its potential by the redemption of the
human soul and God’s redemption of the restored body. “By its perfect union with God
the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that although matter, if left to itself, is
corruptible, it will acquire incorruption by the power of the soul.”31 Humanity, as created,
is subject to how it has been created to be by nature. Aquinas believes that as such, God
affirms human nature by redeeming and fulfilling it, not changing it.
It is important to note in the preceding discussion that, both for the created world
in general and human beings specifically, God preserves and affirms the natures of what
He has made. For Pieper, Aquinas' affirmation of the goodness of creation is intended to
emphasize that “created things are good because they were created by God... [including]
the reality of creation in man... [and] all the powers of his being.”32 Pieper argued that
this affirmation of creation stems from Aquinas' “reverence for the reality of the
Incarnation of God.”33 Practically, this requires assent to createdness by each person,
because by rejecting createdness, one rejects the fundamentally good character of God.
Instead, affirmation of created things should result in love of what God has created. Love
is, in part, an act of the will, because “to confirm and affirm something that is already
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accomplished” is an act of the will.34 The affirmation of being, acknowledging that
existence is good, is the first principle upon all reason is based. Affirming or “assenting”
to existence itself is necessary to real perception of reality.35 This assent to human
createdness, creation, and the Creator must be given in order to encounter the world.
AQUINAS ON PERCEPTION OF REALITY
There are two necessary conditions to be met in order to be able to perceive
reality. First, the perceiving subject must have the capacity to perceive in general. How
does Aquinas know that humanity can perceive the world? Returning to the concept of
human createdness as discussed above, Aquinas believed that humans are endowed by
God with a nature that has the power to perceive created things. Against the Augustinians,
who claimed that spiritual knowledge was not related to the use of the senses, Aquinas
affirmed that all knowledge is “somehow dependent upon sense perception.”36 Perception
of reality through the senses is what allows us to form universal ideas or concepts within
our intellect.37 Our intellects take sense impressions and abstract them into immaterial
forms which can be understood by the mind, and then acted upon.38 Second, the
perceived object must exist. As Davies discusses in reference to the second book of the
Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas opposed those who doubted the existence of the
external world assuming “that it is obvious that we live among physical things that act on
us as we act upon them.”39
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The mode of perception used by human persons is the reason,40 which for Aquinas
includes both ratio and intellectus.41 Ratio is discursive reasoning, or the ability to
connect premises, things, or concepts; sometimes this entails the use of logic, but not
necessarily in the formal sense. Ratio is the part of the reason which examines things
presented to the senses and creates a likeness of those things in order that they can be
understood by the human mind. Intellectus is the form of reason which intuitively
perceives reality or imagines what could be. It is passive in the technical sense used by
Aquinas because it operates by moving from the potential to understand to actual
understanding without effort.42 The intellectus is receptive to sense impressions, and it is
the form of reason which understands first principles. First principles are directly
understood by the intellectus. This is unlike ratio which actively strives to move,
sometimes painfully, from one idea to one which can be connected to that first idea in
some way. The ratio constructs ideas about the world through a process of discursive
reasoning. These two parts of reason are part of “the same” reason, but act in different
ways upon the same objects.43 It is the intellectus which contemplates.
While these two elements of the reason relate to the world in different ways, each
depends on the correct operation of the other. If the senses are impaired due to the heat of
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anger, the operation of the ratio is hindered—it is not as easy to logically discuss one’s
obligation to a group after suffering harm from them. Yet so is the intellectus, which
depends on the ratio to reason from direct perception to new ideas.44 Insofar as a person
wilfully refuses to practice temperance, the hindrance of the reason may be attributable to
a sin like lust or gluttony.45 The ratio, on the other hand, depends for its ability to reason
upon certain principles which can only be learned through direct illumination of the
mind. An example of a foundational principle is the principle of non-contradiction, that a
thing cannot be itself and not itself. Though Aquinas admits the possibility that the senses
may sometimes be impaired by the body, he assumes that it is generally possible to know
the world through sense impression.46
Human perception relies on the existence of God who created people able to
perceive: “a natural thing is placed between two knowing subjects”—knowing subjects
being the knowing person and God.47 Josef Pieper found Aquinas’ discussion of this
double relationship of knowledge in On Truth important enough to return to in multiple
works, so it is worth spending time to consider it. In the first question of On Truth, two
kinds of truth are considered, truth as it exists in a thing and truth as it exists in the mind.
For human persons, truth is in the intellect as the intellect judges the conformity of a
mind’s idea of an object to the object itself.48 The standard for truth is the created object;
whether the idea in the mind conforms to that object determines whether truth is in the
intellect. However, the same thing is given shape by its Creator, God. In relation to God,
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“these things are themselves measured” and a given creatura can be called true if it
“fulfills the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect.”49 In this way, a given
thing is “placed between two knowing subjects,” one of which it measures and by Whom
it is measured.
God knows individual created things directly,50 but the human mind is only able to
know God through the knowledge of created things:
“…all different things imitate God in different ways; and, according to
different forms, they represent the one simple form of God, since in His
form are found perfectly united all the perfections that are found, distinct
and multiple, among creatures.”51
The light which enables our minds to know individual things is the divine light.52 This
divine light is a gift; being created to perceive is a gift; the perceivability of created
things is a gift. Every aspect of our ability to know and be known is a divine gift.53
Because God sustains and creates the world through His thought, humans can
know.54 As explained above, God’s sustaining of the world takes place through a creative
thought which summons the world into and upholds the world’s continued existence.
Creatura “cannot exist except by reason of the divine intellect which keeps bringing them
into being.”55 We are able to know the truth of things “secondarily” rather than primarily.
God is the cause of truth in creatura; in contrast, truth is an “effect” of the human
intellect’s perception of a thing “in the sense that the latter receives its knowledge from
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things.”56 It is important to note, however, that creatura can be known because we are
able to “receive knowledge” from them. This quality of ‘self-revelation’ is found in any
created thing: “in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of
being proportioned to intellect.”57 What this means is that anything that exists can be
understood, to some degree, by the human mind. The ability to be understood is a
property of existence itself.
Our perception of reality is limited not by reality's unknowability but by the
human incapacity to comprehend all of God: “we cannot give God a name that defines or
includes or equals his essence: since we do not know to that extent what God
is.”58Aquinas notes that human knowledge about God is highly circumscribed; through
reason, we can only know what God is not, not what he is.59 God creates and measures all
things; God is not given measure by anything because this would put God in a lesser
position to His measurer. Schumacher summarizes Pieper’s position that Aquinas’
metaphysics of creation necessarily entails an “impossibility of arriving at a final
understanding of anything” because the essential natures of each creatura come from their
being creatively thought by God, who alone can fully comprehend the essence of each
thing.60 Each being’s essence was created by God, who is not able to be known by the
finite human mind. To a lesser extent, the essence of each created thing expresses that
same unknowability. Created and shaped by an infinite God, were a thing to be totally
knowable to the created person it would no longer partake even in some small way of the
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vastness of God. Yet although God is infinitely greater than the human mind can grasp, it
is also true that “our intellect is led… to the divine knowledge so as to know about God
that He is, and other such truths….”61 To look intently at reality is to realize the extent of
the mystery which confronts us.
To summarize, human perception takes place through the working of the reason,
which is given to humans as a capacity within human nature. Among the capacities of
creaturae in general is to both give measure (to the human intellect) and to be measured
(by the divine intellect). Human knowledge is measured by God and by the created
world; the only category of things that humans measure is things that have been invented
or made by people.62 Truth “resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect… truth is
defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to
know truth.”63 For a human person to accurately perceive the world requires that the
ideas about the world present in their intellect be conformed to reality which has been
created by God.
AQUINAS ON THE HIGHEST GOOD AND ULTIMATE END
For Aquinas, the ultimate end of human life, the only thing which can satisfy
human desire, is union with God. There is nothing else which can fulfill the human desire
for happiness. Aquinas argues that this is because God, the “source and goal” of human
life, has created human nature to find “fulfillment, but not replacement or rejection” in
the final union with Himself which is—as noted above—human destiny.64 This is the end
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for which all human striving seeks. It is helpful, however, to dwell more closely on a few
themes which come up in Pieper’s works on the moral life, specifically how the person
achieves this union with God. It is the mind, the means by which a person comprehends
reality, which is the means the person uses to seek the good. Furthermore, it is an act of
the intellect by which good is taken into the person. What is the good for which the
person should seek? That one thing that will produce “final and perfect happiness”:
“nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence” Aquinas says, “… thus it will have
its perfection through union with God.”65
Western philosophy of mind, including Aquinas, has historically taught that it is
not possible to separate human nature from the mind and that the will is a part of the
created soul.66 In humans, “the one principle and root of all [willing] is love.”67 Love of
some good is the motivation for every action. Every act of the will is oriented toward
some good, because every act of the will is motivated by love of some good whether
positively (a desire to seek it out) or negatively (a desire to avoid it). “For nobody desires
anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved…”68 As the person seeks
good in the world, reality is “simply” perceived by the intellectus. In addition, the:
“‘good’ is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the
practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for
an end under the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle of
practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is
that which all things seek after.”69
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Thus, the mind naturally moves from a passive perception of “what reality is” to an active
attempt to identify what is good in reality and a striving to obtain what is desired by the
will—the good.
“The essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect.”70 Pieper comments
that for Aquinas, the most perfect satisfaction of human longing
“takes place in the manner in which we become aware of reality; the whole
energy of our being is ultimately directed toward attainment of insight.
The perfectly happy person...is one who sees.”71
Aquinas does not allow for exceptions; any happiness that any person experiences is an
act of the intellect, as the object of happiness is brought into the person through the
operation of the intellect. Knowledge precedes the movement of the will in loving,
because one must perceive what is loved before the will can be inclined toward it.72 One
objection to this picture of happiness considered by Aquinas is that happiness is “he who
has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.”73 Aquinas acknowledges this to be a
condition for happiness but he argues that while a happy person is satisfied when she has
what she desires, “having, however, takes place by something other than an act of will.”74
As Pieper summarizes it: “having” or “possession of the beloved... takes place in an act
of cognition, in seeing, in intuition, in contemplation.”75
By happiness, Aquinas means the happiness which, having been attained, is so
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satisfying that a person cannot desire anything else. The desire of the will for happiness is
infinite; there is no end to the appetite for diversion.76 Nothing created can satisfy the
desire for happiness, because the soul is by nature is formed so that it can take in the
entire universe. Yet if nothing can satisfy the desire for happiness, was humanity created
to suffer without satisfaction of this desire for the good? Aquinas answers by stating that
nothing suffices to satisfy the will of man other than the “whole of all goodness”, which
is not able to be found in any individual created thing or even every created thing; the
person is only able to find it in God, because the goodness of God surpasses all else.77
Aquinas argues that the “vision of the Divine Essence” is the source of
happiness.78 As noted in the first chapter, contemplation of God can seem like a cold
substitute for whatever one conceives happiness to be, but Aquinas notes that happiness
includes emotions. Thus, according to Aquinas, it is possible to find perfect emotional
happiness in God.79 It is human nature for a person to love God more than anything else,
including her own self. While God, who created the human will to desire happiness, is the
ultimate source of that desire, the will nonetheless desires happiness freely.80 Note,
though, the difference between human nature and what each person does. While many
people do love themselves more than God, because “God is the universal good” and good
is what is eternally sought by the will, to love anything more than God is to work against
human nature.81 For Aquinas, by knowing and contemplating God, our mind is oriented

Aquinas, "ST." I.II 2, 1 ad 3.
Aquinas, "ST." I.II 2, 8.
78
Aquinas, "ST." I.II 3, 8.
79
Aquinas, "ST." I.II 4, 5 ad 5.
80
Aquinas, "ST." I.II 6, 1 ad. 3.
81
Aquinas, "ST." I, 60, 5.
76
77

47

toward the source of happiness and our will’s desire for happiness is satisfied.
Pieper's identification of the centrality of Aquinas' metaphysics of creation to
Aquinas' work resulted in a frequent return to the view of the world as “created” within
Pieper's own writing. His argument that the human desire for happiness can only be
fulfilled by contact with something outside ourselves which surpasses our ability to
master it becomes easier to understand by reading Aquinas, who notes that the human
person is created to be fulfilled in union with God. Aquinas’ insistence that God preserves
and affirms the natures of what He has created is the reason for the high regard in which
Pieper holds created reality. Createdness is also relevant to understanding Aquinas’ theory
of perception. Pieper relies on the double relationship between the human mind and the
Divine mind for confidence that the human reason operates accurately. Pieper agrees
with Aquinas that without assenting to the existence of the Creator, it is impossible to be
confident that the human mind truly is perceiving what exists in the world. To understand
Pieper, one must recall his adherence to Aquinas’ answer to what can satisfy the human
desire for happiness. Only union with God is the destination and fulfillment of human
life, and the goal of the moral life is to live in such a way that union with God can be
attained. Having discussed Pieper’s approach to the three concepts discussed—assent to
createdness, perception of reality, and the final end of human life—and having surveyed
some of Aquinas’ thoughts on these topics, the main section of this thesis will analyze
select works of Pieper’s moral philosophy, in which he discusses living the humane life,
through the lens of these ideas. Without this understanding of Aquinas’ work on
createdness, Pieper’s arguments lack necessary context.
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CHAPTER 4:
CREATEDNESS IN PIEPER’S WORKS ON THE VIRTUES, LEISURE, AND REST
In Pieper’s seven essays on the virtues, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, and In Tune
with the World: A Theory of Festivity, Pieper uses the concepts of assent to createdness,
perception of reality, and pursuit of the end of human life to affirm the necessity of
specific practices. These practices include the seven virtues, as well as other activities
which lead to rest and celebration. For Pieper, human virtues are neither abstract concepts
nor emotions, nor attitudes, but specific practices necessarily embodied and concretely
acted in a manner that accords with human nature and leads to the end of human life. In
the preface to The Four Cardinal Virtues, Pieper states that “the doctrine of virtue...
speaks both of the kind of being which is his when he enters the world, as a consequence
of his createdness, and the kind of being he ought to strive toward and attain to—by
being prudent, just, brave, and temperate.”1
Though not always discussed in the language used above, the three themes under
consideration help the reader understand Pieper’s moral philosophy, so there is value in
identifying how these themes are present in specific works. The goal of this analysis is
not to explicitly identify instances where Pieper uses the language of this framework—as
the framework is not Pieper’s, but the author’s—but to demonstrate how the ideas
underlying the framework are expressed in Pieper’s idea of the virtuous life. I argue that
this is the case in both Pieper’s essays on the seven virtues as well as two of his works
which are not generally grouped with the virtues: Leisure, the Basis of Culture and A
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Theory of Festivity. The latter two work are especially significant to this analysis because
they present a more holistic picture of the ideal human life, rather than isolating a virtue
from the kind of life to which it ought to lead.
THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
Pieper’s moral philosophy prioritized the practice of the virtues because he saw it
as freer than a moral philosophy more concerned with “commandments or duties” than an
orientation toward the end of human existence.2 As noted above, Pieper began his
university studies in the faculty of theology but quickly moved to philosophy; he thus
would probably have had some limited experience with the German 20th century
manualists such as those discussed by Keenan.3 Pieper primarily read philosophers in
addition to patristic and scholastic theologians, rather than casuists or manualists, the
latter of whom were the primary source of moral theology at the beginning of the
twentieth century.4 Pieper’s moral philosophy was also shaped by the debates on the
“sources of Christian ethics” occurring in Germany in the first three decades of the
twentieth century.5 Lottin critiques the manualists and, like Pieper, notes Aquinas’
identification of the centrality of prudence in ethics and advocates for a turn to the
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“person” in ethical reflection.6 Pieper also has some similarity to Bernard Häring’s early
work.7 Pieper follows the division of the virtues into the natural, or cardinal virtues,
which Pieper argues can be somewhat attained by the non-Christian person; and the
theological virtues, which are infused into the human soul by supernatural grace. Despite
his interest in theology, Pieper writes as a philosopher when—although he acknowledges
that some contemporary theologians had criticized the system of the virtues which he
uses as “too philosophical and not scriptural enough”—he defends his use of the
traditional list of the seven virtues because of its awareness of human “createdness.”8
Pieper’s works on the virtues reflect on properly human action, actions that accord
with human nature, in an imperfect world. His essays reviewed in this section were
written over a span of thirty-eight years, and consequently vary in style, maturity, and
focus.9 Although Pieper did not begin On Fortitude intending to write on each of the
virtues systematically, by the publication of On Love in 1972 common themes can be
discerned in the essays. Pieper’s essays situate the created person in the world, which is
especially important to understanding temperance. Temperance directs a person to choose
the amount of a good which will preserve peace within a person. Acknowledgment of our
createdness is related to our journey to God, an important aspect of faith. Perception of
reality is especially discussed in the context of prudence, justice, and love. Justice is the
virtue that directs the person to choose the good owed to another person in order to
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restore an external order of peace. Fortitude directs a person to choose a great good
despite difficulty. The pursuit of the good and knowledge of our end in God is especially
important to the practice of fortitude as well as hope, both of which stem from desire for
happiness and a rejection of everything not oriented toward the good. For Pieper, the
practice of each of the virtues depends on understanding and pursuing the final end of
human existence—contemplation of and unity with God.
Following Aquinas, Pieper argues that prudence is the crown of the virtues
because it is “the cause of other virtues’ being virtues at all.”10 Prudence is “a habit of
choosing, i.e. making us choose well” and choosing the good is necessary for the practice
of any other virtue.11 If a person cannot perceive the good, even actions which appear
virtuous will not be virtuous actions; to risk danger to kill an innocent person is not a
virtuous action.12 The virtue of prudence is the habit of perceiving reality in order to
identify which concrete act should be taken to pursue the good. Prudence primarily
relates to two aspects of being created: the perception of reality and the identification of
the good as it is present in a specific circumstance. The aspect of prudence which Pieper
argues is crucial to understand the virtue is its ability to aid a person’s perception of
reality. Prudence is “the perfected ability to make right decisions.”13 In the context of
prudence, the ‘realization of the good’ is achieved by performing the actions that accord
with what is “appropriate to the real situation.” Without clear perception of reality, or
contact with the “objective world of being,” it is impossible to act in accordance with
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what is real.14 Prudence operates using the reason which observes and is measured by
reality outside the person. Prudence receives the “revelation of reality” through the
intellectus and operates to judge whether an action is in accordance with the good that is
held in the mind. To be prudent, a person must be oriented toward reality.
Although knowledge of ultimate goodness is necessary to practice prudence in its
highest form, prudence on a practical level is primarily concerned with making sure “the
means to the end” is good.15 The prudent action can only be determined within the
context of actual situations, and only the person involved can decide what the truly
prudent action is.16 In his essay on fortitude, Pieper distinguishes prudence from the
modern “slyness” or “discretion” which is “conjured up by the coward to… be able to
shirk the test.”17 This is an important point because in Pieper’s moral calculus, any unjust
action, lie, or other sin is imprudent as well as a failure to practice another virtue; this
accords with Pieper’s understanding of the unity of the virtues. Obstacles to prudence
include thoughtless actions, hesitation, and irresoluteness.18 A person can also fail to act
prudently when their action is directed toward imperfect ends, or regard “tactics” as more
important than goodness.19 Prudence militates against an ethic which sacrifices right
means in favor of a perceived greater good, because unjust means also affect reality, and
reality must always be considered when choosing to act. Prudential actions are those in
which “not only the end of human action but also the means for its realization” are “in
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keeping with the truth of real things.”20 Prudence is perfected on the natural level when a
person is able to understand whether an action will lead to the realization of the good.21
Prudence, more than any other cardinal virtue, fulfills human potential by
enabling the person to live according to human nature in concrete circumstances.
Prudence ultimately directs the will to act in accordance with the truth of createdness—
both the acting person’s createdness, as well as that of everything else in the world. 22 As
discussed above, for Aquinas the final end for which all people seek, knowingly or not, is
the beatific vision found in union with God. The purpose of prudence, then, is to discover
the actions which lead each individual person to closer to beatitude.23 Prudence enables a
person to approach goodness by revealing which individual actions will lead to the
ultimate good.24 The role of prudence is to understand the concrete situation of an
individual and enable the person to respond in such a way that they can draw closer to
God through their actions.25
Justice is the virtue which enables a person to will the good for another.26 Justice
as a natural virtue recognizes what goods are owed to other created persons by virtue of
their createdness.27 Fundamentally, to act justly is “to owe something and to pay the
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debt.”28 Having recognized the reality of another person, the role of justice is to enable a
person to act for the good of another person and for society. Pieper’s understanding of
justice as related to created human nature is most clearly revealed where he discusses
unpayable debts of justice. These debts are unpayable, not because of an unjust action or
a disregard for the restoration of justice, but as a consequence of human createdness. In
order to acknowledge the debt of justice it is also necessary to recognize that, as Aquinas
emphasizes, existence “for the sake of existing” is a good because it is a participation in
the kind of existence God has.29
Certain debts cannot be repaid because the gift given—existence—is of infinitely
greater value than any action taken to repay the gift. These two unpayable debts of justice
are the debt the created person owes to the Creator; and the debts a person owes to her
parents. When that debt cannot be repaid, the “limits” of justice because of the nature of
created order can be clearly perceived.30 A totally just order cannot be achieved simply
because not everything that is owed can be repaid.31 This injustice, however, ought not be
the kind of injustice which accepts wrongs; it is an injustice founded on the inability to
repay a good, which nevertheless requires the repayment of the debt insofar as it can be
paid.
A person’s debt to her parents and her country is not able to be fully satisfied.32
There can be no justice between a person and her parent, because it is impossible to repay
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the gift of being given life. “The relation of children to parents [ought to be] experienced
by the children as an obligation beyond the scope of full restitution.”33 Justice between a
parent and a child is not predicated on equality, and therefore their relationship is not one
of strict justice but, as Aquinas describes, paternal justice.34 This is a humbling realization
which requires the acceptance of human existence as limited and finite. Similarly, but to
an infinitely more intense degree, there can be no full repayment of the debt between a
created being and the Creator. The Creator bestows on each person a right to justice
which cannot be taken away.35 Each person is given absolute, “inalienable rights”
because of their created nature.36 “Now a created thing begins to have something of its
own by creation.”37 This inalienable right to justice is ours by virtue of our createdness.
Although neither debt cannot be repaid, the endowment of the person with
existence also creates moral obligations in addition to rights. Every person has an
absolute duty to fulfill their moral obligations. Yet there can be no adequate recompense
for the gift of being created.38 One cannot ever get “even” with God because God has
gifted us with our being. The relation of the person to the Creator is therefore one of
absolute obligation. Yet although “we cannot offer God an equal return” each person is
obligated to “repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.”39
Pieper identifies this unpayable obligation of justice as the foundation as our duty to
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worship, a duty which will be returned to later in the chapter.40 This obligation to God is
also fulfilled, in part, by the practice of good works within society insofar as those acts
are directed to God.41 The virtue of justice is therefore totally dependent on recognition of
our createdness. Having been given existence, each person must practice justice because
of the debt owed to God and to society. As a created being, each person also has the right
to be treated justly by others.
Each of the virtues serves to conform a person’s acts to the structure of reality.42
Fortitude is expressed when acting in accordance with reality requires taking action
which may endanger a person’s own life, because she oesteems some good (often justice)
more than life itself.43 Fortitude is most characteristically expressed in that moment when
a human person is “placed in a position to be injured or killed for the realization of the
good” when “evil considered in terms of this world… [appears] as an overwhelming
power” and yet, they choose to realize the good by enduring the evil.44 Fortitude
presumes the possibility of injury to the acting person and yet the brave person acts
regardless.45 Fortitude does not depend on the possibility of earthly victory; it esteems the
good it seeks more highly than public vindication.46 Paraphrasing Aquinas, Pieper states
that the truest expression of fortitude is the refusal to submit to evil even when all action
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has been taken away. Thus, the highest expression of Christian fortitude is the willingness
to be martyred.47
The virtue of fortitude is shaped by the created nature of the human person—it is
only ever necessary because of the vulnerability of the human person to harm, danger,
and death.48 A body able to be endangered is required for fortitude; only embodied souls
can consider the good and act rationally to pursue the good while endangering their
bodies. Animals can endanger their bodies yet not rationally consider the good;
disembodied spirits can consider the good yet do not have mortal lives to endanger. For
Aquinas, fortitude also serves to “safeguard” the operation of the ratio “because fear of
danger of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason.”49
Fortitude presupposes knowledge of the good, acquired through the “direct
cognition” of prudence.50 The brave person is not simply foolhardy or rash but
understands what is truly good in the world, as well as to what specific danger they are
exposing themselves.51 Although a person may not value their own life more than some
good pursued, the brave person must value their life appropriately, or else their action is
suicidal rather than motivated by bravery.52 The opposition to suicide requires a more
subtle appreciation of the good of created existence, and an acknowledgment, as Aquinas
draws out in On The Power of God, of the specific goodness of “[existing] for the sake of
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existing.”53 The joys of human life are not to be “[tossed] aside and [esteemed] but
lightly—unless, indeed, to preserve higher goods, the loss of which would injure more
deeply the inmost core of human existence.”54 Christian fortitude always hopes to
achieve—and confidently looks for heavenly—victory but as Pieper notes, it is not the
“effort” but the “end” which is the goal of fortitude.55
Pieper describes temperance as the “discipline of… selfless self-preservation,”
which is a habitual orientation toward the self to preserve a person’s life by guarding
against “selfish perversion of the inner order.”56 Because temperance is so intimately
related to the passions of the body, Pieper argues that intemperance is usually rooted in “a
misconceived view of created reality.”57 The various aspects of temperance which Pieper
discusses show that it serves to enable the person to clearly perceive reality by ordering
the soul. Virtues which Pieper associates with temperance include “chastity, continence,
humility, gentleness, mildness, studiositas”58—each of which is an opposite to some vice.
Temperance is a difficult virtue to master because the temptations associated with the
body are fundamental desires related to the preservation of life.
Temperance recognizes that the human person is not equal to the Creator. Thus,
the virtue of humility is essential to the practice of temperance because humility “looks to
first God” in order to perceive the limitations inherent in the human body and moderate
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the passions.59 Yet humility does not denigrate the human body. While pride asserts a lie
against the truth of reality, humility allows the person to perceive what “by reason of
God’s will, really is.”60 Pieper’s approach to temperance is derived from Aquinas’
affirmation of the goodness of existence; and specifically, Aquinas’ regard for the
Incarnation of Christ. The human body has been redeemed through the action in which
“human nature in Christ was assumed into a oneness of person” (that oneness of person
being Christ’s divine personhood) “in order to repair it.”61 For all those living after the
Incarnation, the human body is no longer necessarily evil but subject to God’s redeeming
action.62 Moreover, the human body is used in the practice of the virtues and the pursuit
of the end of human life. The temperate person therefore recognizes the lowliness of the
human person as compared to the Creator without falsely regarding it as irredeemable
and necessarily evil.
What all the virtues associated with the cardinal virtue of temperance have in
common is their purpose: to joyfully “relinquish the created for the sake of the
Creator.”63 The most characteristic form of temperance is chastity64 as unchastity more
than any other form of immoderation “begets a blindness of spirit… [and] splits the
power of decision,” Pieper says.65 In chastity, Pieper reads Aquinas as affirming that
sexual intercourse is created by God and therefore like the rest of creation is potentially
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good—if fallen—rather than intrinsically evil.66 Despite the difficulty of becoming
temperate, once achieved temperance “extends its ordering mastery down to the
fountainhead from which the figure of moral man springs up unceasingly.”67 The
temperate person lives a clear, measured, and peaceful life.
Aquinas’ treatment of the disciplines which fall under temperance follow from a
view of the human person which is a sober evaluation of the reality of sin. Each
discipline guards against some misuse of the human desires and passions. Any kind of
exaggerated desire for bodily pleasure such as attachment to food and drink will
eventually lead to hebetudo sensus, a “dulling of the inner sense.”68 Each of these kinds
of intemperance are a distorted desire for something good.69 These other desires are
ultimately the prioritization of some other good over the ultimate end of human life,
union with God. For Pieper, beatitude can only be received by a person whose soul has
been preserved from disorder by temperance.
THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES
Pieper believed that the cardinal virtues could be achieved to some extent by any
person. Because Pieper has a strong sense of the continuity of the natural virtues with
their supernatural forms, in his essays Pieper also discusses each cardinal virtue as it
exists in its grace-infused, Christian form. Each of the cardinal virtues in a Christian can
be reoriented from whatever good the person seeks to the ultimate good. In contrast, the
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theological virtues—faith, hope, and love—are specifically Christian virtues granted by
an infusion of God’s grace. In their natural forms, these virtues can be directed toward
any desired object and therefore are not virtues under Aquinas’ definition of the virtues as
habits which cannot be directed toward evil. Faith, hope, and love can be directed to evil
ends; thus, only by infused grace are they virtues.70 The origin of each theological virtue
is grace, and the end of each is happiness in God.71
While the cardinal virtues relate primarily to actions which can be perceived by
external observers, hope, faith, and love have an interior character which can be difficult
to perceive in another person. Moreover, in contemporary usage they are often
understood to be emotions. While Pieper does not dismiss the emotional dimension of the
three theological virtues, he argues that they are better understood as acts. Pieper
expresses the relationship between the three in this way: faith perceives the “reality of
God… Love affirms the Highest Good… Hope is the confidently patient expectation of
eternal beatitude.”72 Pieper describes the theological virtues in terms which make it clear
that they rely on the operation of the intellectus, rather than the faculty of discursive
reasoning, the ratio.
In his essay on faith, Pieper argues that faith is not only a virtue but is also
necessary to assent to Christianity in the modern world. Pieper agrees with Karl Rahner
that contemporary Christian theologians have provided “few intellectual tools” to respond
to the crisis of faith in his contemporaries. In particular, advances in the sciences have
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made it more difficult to conceive of God in the way pre-modern Christians did.73 Yet if,
as Christianity asserts, we live in a world which is more than material and goodness is
more than material; and if, for life to be complete, we must know the good; then, because
our senses are limited, we must take an assertion of what goodness is on faith. Our
natural, material knowledge will not satisfy our longing for the good.74 The solution to
this crisis of knowledge of the spiritual world is belief. Faith carries us past the operation
of the ratio into the realm of the intellectus, in which belief can be affirmed even where
there is a lack of empirically verifiable evidence for that belief. Pieper defines ‘belief’ as
“an unrestricted, unreserved, unconditional assent.”75 When a person has faith, he affirms
that some statement reflects “real, objectively existent” reality,76 “[grasping] out of his
own knowledge” what the statement means, and yet acknowledging that he is without the
ability to “prove it.”77 Faith requires affirming specific witnesses to the truth as
trustworthy and accepting the limitation of empirical knowledge in the realm of the spirit.
Aquinas’ idea of revelation as the divine light which illuminates the intellect is a helpful
way to frame Pieper’s discussion of this topic.
For Pieper, faith is embodied in personal relationships. Faith originates in the will,
which, since the will is always directed toward the love of some good, is oriented toward
the “person of the witness,” affirming and “loving” them.78 A separate phenomenon often
confused for faith is a conviction of the truth of a statement based on witnesses, scientia
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testimonialis. This is not truly ‘belief’ but a reasoned conclusion which takes the
witnesses as evidence.79 Pure belief rests on the acceptance of what a person states is true
“for the sole reason that the person says so.”80 Belief is therefore impossible to separate
from the relationship between the witness and the person who has faith; faith is
necessarily present in individuals. The virtue of Christian faith requires belief in what the
Christian Church teaches about God. While God is the only one capable of revealing the
whole truth about reality, that truth is ordinarily communicated through the tradition of
the Church. Pieper argues that faith in God must be able to be attained by every
Christian,81 but there is not usually direct contact between an individual and God. So,
every person who has faith, has faith in God through the mediation of the Church.
“Fides implicita can enable the simplest mind, the one farthest removed
from the original light, as well as the one only half-instructed, to 'belong'
and have a share in the revealed truth—by virtue of his believing tie to one
who knows at first hand… the Author [God]…”82
This affirmation of belief in a person’s witness is the basis for faith.
Pieper argues that there are four conditions that must be met before being able to
acknowledge that revelation is indeed trustworthy. First, there must be acknowledgement
that humanity is created. Second, acceptance of revelation requires maintaining a posture
of “openness” and “receptivity” to the nature of the universe. Third, revelation requires
welcoming the insights of others. Fourth, acceptance of revelation demands
acknowledgment that there are forms of insight which are valid and which “have great
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weight for certain persons while they may mean nothing to others.”83 These forms of
insight can only be perceived by the intellectus, not deduced through logic. The
intellectus looks to another person to discern their trustworthiness in the specific mode of
intuition: “a rapid, penetrating and direct cognition of a unique kind.”84 Acceptance of
revelation ultimately depends on a person’s willingness to accept another person as a
source of knowledge. Acknowledging the insights of others and receptivity to alternate
kinds of knowing open us to the kind of knowledge that comes by the grace of faith,
which is a clearer perception of God than that available to the natural reason.85
Pieper proposes a retrieval of Aquinas’ description of revelation as the divine light
which enables the intellect to perceive realities of the world which would be otherwise
hidden in darkness.86 The divine light “enables the intellect to understand in the same
way as a habit makes a power abler to act.”87 As noted above, belief in Christian
revelation depends on personal involvement. Revelation is not a neutral “fact” which has
no consequences for the internal life; rather, the Christian “in accepting the message of
the self-revealing God, actually partakes of the divine life therein announced.”88 The
relational character of faith means that a statement cannot be extracted from the context
in which it is spoken by a person, who must be judged as trustworthy in order for another
person to have belief in the statement.89 In the context of Christian faith, this means that
belief in God by way of belief in testimony about the divine life has a transformational
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effect which creates a different reality in the believing person. “If God has really spoken,
then it is not only good to believe him; rather the act of believing generates those things
that in fact are goodness and perfection for man.”90
Hope is the virtue which looks to the final end of human life, which cannot be
achieved during life on earth. As a Christian virtue, hope pursues union with God and
renewed creation. Because the object of hope will not be completely attained before
death, hope is the virtue of the Christian life as it exists ‘on-the-way.’ The created person
is always existing as incomplete in life and will remain incomplete until death.91 Hope
responds to the incomplete satisfaction of the accomplishment of any earthly striving by
affirming the goodness of created reality and humbly responding to God. Yet while this
satisfaction is incomplete, it is still real. The “existential uncertainty” of human life
should result in an understanding of man’s “finite nature that does not have being from
himself and therefore does not possess himself… that takes refuge in the merciful power
of God’s decrees.”92 Through grace, the Christian affirms that Christ is both the
foundation and the fulfilment of hope.93
The end the person looks for is beatitude, the state of perfect union which fulfills
the longing for good which is the characteristic desire of human nature. Pieper cites
Aquinas’ On the Power of God to affirm that being is by nature “directed toward a good
[existence].”94 The human will desires to be satisfied by goodness, and will not rest until
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that fulfillment is attained.95 The hope of beatitude affirms truths about human nature,
that the person is directed toward good, against the empirical evidence that the human
body ends in death. Only through the perception through hope that human life is created
for “fulfillment beyond time” can the person understand that the end of the body in death
is not the meaning of human existence, nor even the final terminus of the body.96 Through
an understanding of createdness and through the virtue of hope, it is possible to see
beatitude as “the fulfilment objectively appropriate to our nature.”97 Hope recognizes the
end for which human nature was designed, and anticipates satisfaction in God.98
Natural hope does not assent to created human nature, and therefore fails to
correctly perceive reality by seeking an imperfect good. Natural hope aims at the
satisfaction of human desires with created things, which can never totally satisfy the
infinite longing of the will. The person who relies on natural hope fails to perceive the
limited way in which creation can satisfy the human desire for happiness. Natural hope
aims at the greatest things which can be achieved by humanity, which are the object of
the virtue of magnanimity. Since natural hope is founded on the “vigor” of the natural
body, natural hope inevitably disappoints when the body fails. When a person can no
longer work to achieve whatever they hope for, because of illness or age, they lose their
ability to satisfy their longings for created goods.99 Presumption and despair are more
subtle failures to hope for beatitude. Both anticipate a person’s judgment by God; despair
anticipates damnation, and presumption anticipates the attainment of beatitude. The
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particular failure they express is a failure to assent to createdness, as both presumption
and despair arrogate the role of the Creator, who gives measure to the created person.100
The Christian understanding of hope stands in sharp opposition to this
materialistic understanding of the universe which rejects the Christian understanding of
created human nature. Humility characterizes Christian hope by affirming the distance
between the Creator and the creature. By assenting to created human nature, humility
preserves the person from aiming at the “sham” greatest things and instead aims at what
is really good.101 Unlike the manner in which the person presumes to pass judgment on
her own soul, Pieper argues that Christian hope retains the separation between the Creator
and creatura. Christian hope, above all, seeks the source of goodness, God.102
In the introduction to the volume of his essays on the theological virtues, Pieper
acknowledges the difficult task of writing a treatise on the varieties of love, showing “the
real basis for this identity” while maintaining their distinctions.103 In consequence, On
Love is the longest of Pieper’s essays on the virtues. Pieper seeks to “grasp as much as
[he] can of the multiplicity of the phenomenon we call ‘love.’”104 Love is sometimes
chosen, sometimes undergone; it evaluates, and it can be costly.105 Love has an element
of creation. Love requires “a preexistent relation between the lover and the beloved” yet
it also “yields and creates unity.”106 One must be receptive to love, for love has an
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essential kind of “approving contemplation” which must be present in the lover.107 The
common element between each variety of love Pieper addresses—love for family, for
food, for God, for friend, for lover—is affirmation of the good present in the beloved.
Pieper’s essay on love relies on his ideas of assent to createdness and the
necessity to recognize the reality of the beloved person. For Pieper, it is impossible to
define love without reference to human nature, which is “what man possesses and brings
into the world with him by birth.”108 This nature has been given to the human person.
Pieper argues that the human person is always the subject in the act of love, having
agency and love of her own.109 The human person also has real and meaningful existence
as creatura, “existence that is our own—God-given…to us to be truly our own.”110
Human love is driven by our natures which are driven by desire for goodness; we are “by
nature a totally needful being.” Moreover, we have no power to “change nor, certainly,
destroy” this given nature, which is truly capable of giving love.111 All love is “grounded
in the real” and refers to an existing person who is separate from the lover. Love requires
some recognition of beauty and goodness in another.112 Drawing on Aquinas, Pieper
argues that love for others, things, and God perceives something which is truly present in
them.113 Human love is an affirmation and imitation of God’s ultimate affirmation.114
Love signifies a fundamental approval which says to the beloved “It’s good that you
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exist; it’s good that you are in this world.”115 The will must “assent to what already is” in
the beloved in order to love them. The lover contemplates the beloved, as Aquinas
describes it, “loving what it already possesses and rejoicing in that.”116 When we love
people, we affirm their existence and wish that they might be “in God.”117
Pieper argues with Aquinas that desire is not “human weakness” but ‘the
indisputable beginning of all perfection in love.”118 The desire for happiness is a desire
for “the happiness of love.”119 Pieper argues that what we need is not just existence but
“to be loved by another person,” starting with our mothers, parents, and families, and
extending throughout life into the world. We experience God’s loving affirmation of the
goodness of our existence almost exclusively through the actions of others.120 But this
action of others is, as noted above, rooted in the reality that all people have been
individually “creatively conceived… willed and affirmed” by the Creator.121 The lover,
whether human or Divine, recognizes that the beloved is not what they could be, but the
true lover must perceive the end of the beloved and the good which the beloved could
achieve, and love them into the fulfillment of that end.122 In turn, the beloved must be
willing to accept love as a gift which is unearned and undeserving.123
The common elements which underlie Pieper’s essays on the virtues are a focus
on the need to assent to the createdness of the human person and the created world and to
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perceive the shape of reality in order to pursue the end of human life, which is union with
God. Each discussion of a specific virtue is brought into clearer focus by at least one of
these themes. On Prudence discusses the perception of reality as it is necessary to act in
pursuit of the end of human life. In On Justice, Pieper argues that the rights and
obligations which shape our common life are bestowed on us by virtue of our created
nature. On Fortitude considers how a person ought to pursue good, despite the human
vulnerability to harm, and discusses what that good is. On Temperance discusses the
ways in which the person must act in order to order their soul to seek the good. On Faith
argues for the role of faith in perception of reality. On Hope relies on humility in order to
place the created person in proper relationship to the Creator. Finally, On Love argues that
love essentially is an affirmation of the goodness of some beloved thing or being.
In his works on the seven virtues, Pieper gives a definition of these virtues which
is contextualized by the themes considered in this thesis, but for Pieper the virtuous life is
not complete without a movement from the practice of the specific virtues to an
attainment of the end of the virtues. In Leisure the Basis of Culture and In Tune with the
World: A Theory of Festivity, Pieper’s focus is the attainment of the goal of the virtues.
Leisure and Festivity discuss the possibility of happiness on earth and consider how it can
be attained—by practicing the virtues and by acknowledging the duties that come with
created human nature.
LEISURE, THE BASIS OF CULTURE
Pieper’s discussion of leisure was written immediately after World War II, during
the reconstruction of Germany after the defeat of the Nazi regime. He writes in response
to an attitude among his contemporaries which found the meaning of life in work, rather
71

than (like pre-modern cultures) leisure.124 Modern work, Pieper proposes, had colonized
culture to become “the whole of human activity and even of human life.” This ideology
of “total work,” which Pieper describes as “totalitarian,” is on every point opposed to
Pieper’s idea of human nature.125 Pieper poses the question to his readers: why must a
society establish opportunities for leisure? His answer is that every healthy culture is
founded on communal public worship, which makes life “truly human” and allows for a
clear perception of reality.126 Life without culture has no meaning; it is both caused by
and results in despair.
At its foundation, total work relies solely on ratio—observation, judging, and
discursive reasoning—rather than allowing for the priority of receptive perception and
contemplation, intellectus. As discussed above, Aquinas presents a distinction between
parts of the reason. The reason is comprised of both ratio, the “properly human” form of
reason, and the simplex intuitus or simple vision which makes up the intellectus, the form
of reason which is most similar to superhuman intelligences (the angels and God).127 For
Pieper, “the process of knowing is the action of the two together.”128 In contrast, the
modern world (Pieper references Kant as representative) denies either that the form of
reason known as intellectus exists or that it has intellectual validity.129 Any knowledge
achieved is earned by intellectual labor; nothing is gifted. Intellectual work is
characterized by discursive reasoning, difficulty, and is oriented toward filling a specific
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place in the “social system.”130 The pursuit of knowledge is only good insofar as it is
oriented toward a specific need; the liberal arts are redefined to serve a utilitarian
purpose. While the pre-modern world would speak of leisure and “not-leisure” (otium vs.
negotium in Latin), the modern world of work reverses that: life is work or “not-work.”
In contrast to the ideology of total work, Pieper cites Aquinas, who believed that it is
necessary for the good of the whole society that there be those whose lives be devoted to
contemplation.131 Pieper argues that to deny the existence of intellectus is to deny the
possibility of philosophical reflection in the ancient sense, making any act of reason
work.
Total work distorts human nature because it springs from acedia, the vice opposed
to hope. Pieper identifies acedia as a widespread modern habit which is ultimately a
rejection of human personhood, a denial of humanity as creatura, and a refusal “to be as
God wants him to be,” a non-assent to “what he really, fundamentally is.”132 This
rejection of createdness results in a person unable to be at peace internally or externally,
unable to reconcile one with oneself. Vices which follow from acedia are restless activity
because a person cannot tolerate silence; 133 idleness stemming from a “deep-seated lack
of calm;”134 and despair. Acedia results in a rejection of peace, whether that is expressed
in frantic activity or paralysis. Pieper compares sleeplessness to idleness; neither fosters
peace.135
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Leisure as a positive act is absent from the ideology of total work. It can only be
regarded as a cessation of work. “Leisure… appears as something wholly… without
rhyme or reason, and, morally speaking, unseemly.”136 It is identified with unwillingness
to work or the incapacity to accomplish anything. Pieper argues to the contrary that those
characteristics are the fruit of acedia. Leisure, instead, results in internal peace which
enables the silent apprehension of reality.137 Like contemplation, leisure is a kind of
internal act which entails welcoming the mystery of creation into one’s being.138 “Leisure
is a resting in which one takes contemplative delight at being and in being.”139 Leisure is
made possible by a fundamental “consent” given to a person’s own createdness and all
creation, the entire universe. “It is like the tranquil silence of lovers, which draws its
strength from concord.”140 This aspect of love and affirmation can overflow into
celebration and even the most heightened form of affirmation—the festival. Unlike
ordered daily work, which has some aspect of difficulty, or disordered total work, which
revels in its own difficulty, leisure is experienced as restorative.141 Like contemplation,
the restorative nature of leisure is attained by gift alone. Unlike “days off” which are
granted in order to restore the worker to be able to continue working, leisure cannot be
instrumentalized to serve an end other than itself; leisure is its own end.142
Leisure is not a “social function”—it is a practice that operates on a totally
different plane of existence than the working life. It is not a pause in work—it is an
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expression of the fully human life. Because it is open to all, leisure provides a way for
every person to pass from the life of activity into the active silence of contemplation.
Every person needs the space to enter into leisure. The ideology of total work, Pieper
believes, presents a real threat to “the preserve of freedom, of education and culture, and
that undiminished humanity which views the world as a whole.”143 The Soviets, who
Pieper encountered in East Berlin and East Germany before the Berlin Wall was built,
attempted to “obliterate a contrast… between the classes” by bringing everyone to the
same level and proscribing unapproved cultural expressions.144 This resulted in the entire
society being engulfed in the ideology of total work in which all activities in society were
required to meet a societal need.145
Leisure ultimately requires a rejection of the claim which the ideology of total
work makes to possess all of existence and a reaffirms divine sovereignty over all
creation. As Pieper remarks:
“There can be no such thing in the world of ‘total labor’ as space which is
not used on principle; no such thing as a plot of ground, or a period of
time withdrawn from use. There is in fact no room in the world of ‘total
labor’ either for divine worship or for a feast: because the ‘worker’s’
world, the world of ‘labor’ rests solely on the principle of rational
utilization.”146
Without the justification of divine worship, Pieper argues that there is no reason to not
use everything ‘rationally.’ The original “days of rest” in Western culture—in Greek and
Roman society as well as Jewish and Christian societies—were set aside for worship.
Both festivity and leisure find their “possibility [and] ultimate justification… in divine
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worship.”147 Pieper argues that a society conducive to humane life would allow for space,
money, and time for each individual to pursue activity, leisure, “which cannot be put at
the disposal of useful ends.”148
IN TUNE WITH THE WORLD: A THEORY OF FESTIVITY
A Theory of Festivity is a recapitulation and intensification of the argument made
in Leisure the Basis of Culture, written nearly fifteen years later. Rather than concentrate
attention on the world of work, which is opposed to leisure, Festivity discusses the
attitude which allows for reception of the gift of celebration. All of Josef Pieper’s works
on the virtues, and even Leisure, the Basis of Culture, orient the person to receive the gift
of festivity in different ways. Certain virtues assist the person to assent to her own
createdness; other virtues help the person to perceive the world; still other virtues are
necessary to build a social order which is oriented to the final end of the human person.
Leisure itself is expressed, in its highest form, as a virtue. In A Theory of Festivity Pieper
combines these various ideas to show how festivity enables the person to become fully
human by bringing earthly life in contact with eternity. Although in A Theory of Festivity,
Pieper cites Aquinas significantly less than most of his other works, the ideas which are
present in it rest on a similar response to the world: assent to human createdness,
perception of reality; and pursuit of the highest good of human existence, which is union
with God.
Immediately prior to the composition of Festivity, Pieper had spent several
months travelling through Asia, visiting cities in India including Calcutta where he
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experienced the Durga festival; he visited Darjeeling; he saw the ceremonies surrounding
death in Banaras as well as a “living goddess” in Nepal; and he encountered Hindus
worshipping at a shrine of St. Anthony in Madras. During his time in India, he had the
chance to have academic discussions with both Hindus and Buddhists but found the
worship and ritual he encountered “much more exciting and also more convincing,”
being “always fascinated anew when religious feelings are lived out.”149 Shortly before
the trip to India, Pieper visited Mexico where he was struck by the intensity of devotion
to Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico.150 Pieper’s reactions to these experiences varied
but in general, he was more sympathetic (if not necessarily approving of) what had arisen
within the older traditions. Interestingly, possibly his strongest negative reaction was
during his encounter with followers of Ramakrishna, who struck him as artificial.151 In
his autobiography, Pieper discusses the central concept of Festivity, which he describes as
“consent to the world.” The composition of Festivity, Pieper notes, was strongly
influenced by the multiple Hindu festivals he had encountered during his time in India. 152
The inner experience of festivity is “barred to non-initiates”—it is impossible to
understand what the essence of a festival is unless you have experienced it.153 In Festivity,
Pieper therefore draws from the festivities he has experienced, which are primarily
Christian festivals. For Christians, there are two primary festivals—Sunday, and Easter.
Sunday is a festival which commemorates the divine rest and that “God himself” by
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creating the world “affirms and loves” every created thing “all of them without
exception.”154 Easter is the characteristic Christian festival, for the resurrection celebrates
a stronger, eternal re-affirmation of God’s creating love.155 Pieper’s discussion of the
Christian festivals is intended to contrast with the pseudo-festivals he gives as counterexamples—festivals celebrated during the French Revolution, in Nazi Germany, and in
the Soviet Union.156 Pieper’s objection to these festivals is that by expressing an incorrect
view of reality—one which crowns labor as the sole source of meaning in life—they do
not succeed in their purpose of celebration. To be true festivity, it must reveal something
of the true face of reality.
Festivity is, like the virtues, necessarily practiced by embodied human persons.
For Pieper, a basic characteristic of festivity is rest from useful work—festivity is in fact
the most heightened form of leisure, described above. Rest is necessary for the created
person, and it is essential that a festival day be a pause from work.157 Festivity also brings
with it an obligation to worship or give some recognition to the Creator, as discussed in
the section on justice. Pieper identifies the meaning at the heart of festivity as worship of
God, or a god, through assent to the goodness of creation. Some token of the goodness of
creation is offered back in every festival. This characteristic of festivity is present in
every human celebration; for example, the festivals of the ancient Greeks and Romans
were seen as “holy time” necessarily involving some kind of ritual sacrifice.158 Unlike the
claims which total work makes, this sacrifice is not imprudent or intemperate; it is the
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just response to createdness. Yet the texts of the Catholic mass (Pieper here is discussing
the pre-conciliar texts of the Roman canon of the mass) also explicitly offer praise,
thanksgiving, petition, and sacrifice to God.159 The reason for worship, in both cases, is
hope that through these rites the people “will be vouchsafed a share in the superhuman
abundance of life” which is a “hoped-for gift,” not anything that can be purchased or
even reliably procured.160 The arts are also usually present as the medium through which
the senses can perceive the spirit of festival.161
Festivity, like leisure, engages the intellectus not the ratio, enabling the person to
achieve a higher degree of openness to reality than is generally present in daily life. True
festivity arises from looking “upon reality whole” while simultaneously pausing from
work oriented toward a practical end.162 The element of contemplation in festivity is a
“relaxation of the strenuous fixation of the eye” on the daily life of work.163 Festivity
allows for peaceful, open perception of all of reality. Those who assent to the world can
celebrate any particular occasion; those whose response to the world is negation can
never rejoice. Pieper defines festivity directly in terms of affirmation.
“To celebrate a festival means: to live out, for some special occasion and
in an uncommon manner, the universal assent to the world as a whole.”
The existence of a great good which is able to be taken into the person elicits a
response—joy.164 Thus, festivals of birth and marriage are celebrated because existence
itself is affirmed as good. “Underlying all festive joy… there has to be an absolutely
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universal affirmation extending to the world as a whole, to the reality of all things and the
existence of man himself.”165 Festivity affirms the world as good even in the face of the
tragic. In fact, festivity is most truly moving when the celebrants look at the whole of
reality and “[offer] the response of joy”—that response can itself be a sacrifice.166 Even
those festivals (Pieper mentions Good Friday) which remember the dead are celebrated
when there is an affirming sense that “grief, sorrow, death are accepted and therefore
affirmed, as meaningful in spite of everything.”167 Those who resist this affirmation are
unable to find rest, contemplation, or festivity.
Yet festivity is not a binary opposite to work or a hatred of daily life.168 It requires
that the ordered round of daily work exist, for “a festival can arise only out of the
foundation of a life whose ordinary shape is given by the working day.”169 Lack of a
purpose in life precludes both festivity and meaningful work.170 Work has meaning when
it provides some concrete good to the world or produces the goods which are used at the
celebration.171 Festivity requires the sacrifice of time which could be devoted to work and
of the goods produced by work. It requires time because festivity requires time be set
aside for the celebration, and it requires goods—both the goods used in the celebration
and those which would have been produced in the time spent working. “A festival is
essentially a phenomenon of wealth… of existential richness.”172 These goods are
renounced for profitable use because of love of a greater good.
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Negation of the world is expressed in acedia, the vice opposed to hope. Acedia
stems from a rejection of the goodness of the world, which makes festivity impossible.
Thus, hope is a virtue necessary to combat the temptation to negate the goodness of
existence because of “historical evil” and the many kinds of horrors present in the
world.173 A different kind of negation exists when “artificial holidays” are celebrated.
Pseudo-festivals occur when people, rather than accepting the happiness of being created
as a gift, arrogate the power over creation which rightly belongs to God, and refuse God
praise.174 This is a failure of prudence and an inability to see the world as it is. Some
pseudo-festivals relatively harmless—local memorials and parades. Others are
deliberately conceived to compete with or replace traditional festivals; for example, the
created “holidays” of the French Revolution which parodied Catholic worship; or the
pseudo-festivals of Nazi Germany.175 These pseudo-festivals were celebrated because
festivity was recognized as necessary for human life, yet they were false because they
celebrated human happiness as already having been achieved by human effort, and
participation was coerced, rather than spontaneous.176
While false festivals suppress affirmation of the real world, a true festival allows
for true perception of reality and therefore affirmation of the goodness of the world. It
necessarily includes worship of the Creator. Crucially, festivity opposes a world of total
work. A festival is celebrated when a society refuses to see the world as solely given over
to productive use, deliberately sacrificing the products of work for the feast. This
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sacrifice places the duty of divine worship at the center of human life and denies that
created goods can satisfy human desire. Festivals require and reorient the human gaze to
perceive
“the goodness of reality taken as a whole which validates all other
particular goods and which man himself can never produce nor simply
translate into social or individual welfare. He truly receives it only when
he accepts it as pure gift. The only fitting way to respond to such gift is:
by praising God.”177
Celebration always ends with praise. It is only through feast that the end of human life,
unity with God, is made present for a time on earth. At a true festival, “man passes
beyond the barriers of this present life on earth” and into divine time.178 This is a
mysterious statement, drawn from the early Church. By this, Pieper asserts that festivity
is a way that the person is able to be drawn up into God, through the gift of an experience
of festivity. “In regarding man and world as creatura we imply that our own existence, as
well as that of things, is founded upon the non-temporal, non-successive, and therefore
still continuing act of creation…. Not that we can, by our power and volition, ‘step out of
time.’ Nevertheless, to do so remains among our real potentialities.” This experience is
pure gift, not at all an earned or even expected accompaniment to the festival. Yet it is
through festival that this experience can be attained.179
The parallels between Pieper’s conception of leisure and festivity are obvious and
intentional. Leisure and festivity require the individual and societal practice of the
virtues. They require prudence to identify the nature of reality and select the correct
course of action. They require justice to determine what each person, as well as God, is
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owed. They require fortitude to reject false conceptions of reality even in the face of
martyrdom—as those who rejected Nazi pseudo-festivals faced. They require
temperance, the virtue which orders the life of each person. For the Christian, leisure and
festivity also require faith that the God will provide for needs, even when work is
deliberately relegated to a part of life. They require hope that the beatitude sought
through festivity is real. And they require love of God and desire to worship him before
every other created good. Because festivity is an intensification of leisure, their origin,
opposite, and meaning are ultimately the same. The affirmation of goodness practiced by
those who take time to rest and celebrate is an expression of love of the world and
ultimately of God.
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CONCLUSION
Josef Pieper’s life was dedicated to seeking the truth that can be found through the
pursuit of philosophy. From an early age, he was dedicated to understanding the world
through philosophy as well as the arts. For Pieper, the western Christian tradition in
which he primarily situated his work was expressed in an exemplary form in the work of
Thomas Aquinas. In particular, Aquinas’ conception of what it means to be a created
person had a lasting impact on Pieper’s moral philosophy. His work was situated in an
area unpopular with his contemporaries, frequently touching on the meaning of being
created by God as it relates to philosophy rather than theology. Josef Pieper knew the
potential consequences of living a virtuous life in a disordered society. His work was
colored by his experience of life in Germany before and during the second World War,
which convinced him of the necessity of the well-ordered life of virtue. His opposition to
the modern world’s fetishization of work above all other goods was rooted in an
acknowledgment of human createdness including the limitations inherent in a physical
body. Yet Pieper’s work is fundamentally hopeful. Drawing on Aquinas’ vision of
beatitude, Pieper consistently argued that every person has the ability to seek and find
ultimate happiness.
While best known for his work Leisure, the Basis of Culture, Pieper’s other works
deserve to be more widely known and studied. Recently, scholars have begun to relate
important concepts within individual works to others; notably, Warne, Wargo, and
Guilbeau have written essays on specific connecting themes between works. Bernard
Schumacher also deserves recognition for his identification of the importance of Aquinas’
metaphysics of creation, which asserts that the human person and all that exists is either
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creation or the Creator, to Pieper’s philosophy. However, each of these works is
somewhat limited in scope and Pieper’s work deserves to be studied in greater depth. In
particular, similarities between virtue ethics and Pieper’s thought should be identified and
studied.
Drawing on Schumacher’s insight, this paper has identified three instances of this
application of Aquinas thought in Pieper’s essays. First, Pieper constantly emphasizes the
necessity of human assent to being fashioned by a creating God. Second, he argues that
the perception of reality is enabled by the human reason which is an unchangeable part of
created human nature. Third, for Pieper, the meaning and purpose of human life is
fulfilled in the end of human existence, which is to contemplate God. These specific ideas
allow for the reading of Pieper's works in the context of Aquinas’ metaphysics of
creation. Without understanding this context, Pieper’s work cannot be understood in the
way he meant it to be. Moreover, Pieper’s repeated return to these ideas in his works on
ethics and practical morality demonstrates the essential unity of Pieper’s practical and
speculative philosophy.
As discussed in the first two chapters of this thesis, certain aspects of Aquinas'
thought play such an important role in Pieper's work that he cannot be understood
without considering them. First, the reader of Pieper must understand his position that
the person must assent to her own existence as a created person in the world. This
requires an acceptance of human nature as having been created by the measuring thought
of God, as discussed in the first section of the first chapter. Pieper appropriates Aquinas’
theological and anthropological insights to support a Christian ethic of the virtuous
human life. Second, the reader of Pieper must understand that human perception of
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reality is enabled by the mind of God, the origin of all that is. While we cannot know
reality in a complete and all-encompassing way, by nature we are created to truly know it,
albeit in a limited way. This knowledge is further made possible by the nature of other
created things, which echo God in the way that they reveal their own existence. Third,
each human life, having emerged from God, is intended to end in union with God. The
goodness which the human person longs for is first identified in the longing for happiness
that the human soul cannot help but experience. Pieper argues that this happiness is only
totally satisfied in the beatific vision, attained as a gift but made possible through the
contemplation of God.
What is at stake in Pieper’s vision of the world? If Pieper is correct, our
philosophy and theology of work and leisure in the modern world is often seriously
incorrect about human nature, the virtues, and the ultimate meaning of life. Pieper
proposes a radical solution to the ills of modern society: the retrieval of the Christian
philosophical tradition in order to reorder society around the necessity for rest and
leisure. Pieper himself took his proposal seriously—rather than teach in a prestigious
position at one of the university faculties he was invited to join, Pieper deliberately chose
to teach teachers and non-specialists in order to reach as many people as possible.
Pieper’s goal was to popularize certain teachings of the western Christian tradition which
had been neglected by his society. Pieper argues for a return to a society which prioritized
divine worship over human achievement, a way of life which has primarily been written
off as outdated or irrelevant.
Pieper challenges the modern academy in method as well as content. While many
Catholic theologians retain admiration for the “wisdom of the ancients,” Pieper’s
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prioritization of teaching outside the academy is rare, and poses the question: is it
appropriate for more philosophers and theologians to direct efforts outside the academy?
Even in Catholic institutions, there can be a disconnect between the priorities of the
dioceses and the academic theologians. Massimo Faggioli, at the 2019 meeting of the
Catholic Theological Society of America Annual Meeting, addressed this point in blunt
words. After describing the relations between academic theologians and the Catholic
hierarchy as one of “mutual estrangement and alienation,” he argues that this alienation
threatens Catholic academic theology more than it does the hierarchy, and warns: “There
is no detachment from the institutional church that does not entail also some detachment
from the real people of God.”1 Faggioli’s argument is that a Catholic theology that
operates in isolation from the Catholic Church risks losing its identity as Catholic. This is
a sobering challenge. Pieper perhaps can serve as a model for a re-engagement with the
wider Church.
Fundamentally, Pieper was a philosopher who was concerned with finding the
truth and teaching it to others. Like Thomas Aquinas, from whom he gained so much
inspiration, Josef Pieper sought to clearly perceive reality in order to communicate that
truth. Pieper’s works were deeply steeped in the works of Aquinas; to understand Pieper,
it is necessary to appreciate the ways Aquinas had a deep impact on Pieper’s thought. In
Pieper’s essays on the virtuous life, it is particularly important to understand certain
concepts related to Aquinas’ metaphysics of creation. Pieper’s moral philosophy argues
that the human person must acknowledge her own createdness and so also the existence

Massimo Faggioli, "Address" (paper presented at the Catholic Theological Society of America,
Pittsburgh, PA, 2019).
1
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of the Creator. Assenting to createdness reveals the limitations of created nature. Through
a patient, welcoming attention to the exterior created world, it is possible to perceive
reality and take the right actions in response. This enables the practice of the virtues.
Through the virtuous life, the human person is conformed to ideal human nature and thus
understands and acknowledges the good which they are created to desire, beatitude.
When each of these steps is taken, it is possible to receive the gift of leisure and festivity.
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